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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the impact of two external forces on executive compensation 
behavior. In the first chapter, the impact of political sensitivity is investigated as an 
external force on government contractor executive compensation. Compensation for top 
executives has come into the political spotlight, especially over the last decade, with 
many politicians publicly supporting limits on compensation. However, the impact of 
political scrutiny to limit compensation is debatable. This study analyzes the effect of 
political scrutiny on CEO compensation using a sample of Federal contractors, which 
represents a group of firms where politicians yield the most power. Results suggest that 
Federal contractors with the most visible government contracts that make up significant 
portions of their revenue have lower CEO compensation, but the efficiency of this 
compensation structure is debatable as it leaves CEOs with weaker incentives. 
However, the impact of political sensitivity is muted when the firm has more bargaining 
power with the government. 
 
In the second chapter, the effects of external forces of mandated compensation 
disclosure and shareholding voting requirements on compensation behavior are 
examined. Given the lack of guidelines provided for Dodd-Frank mandated Pay for 
Performance disclosure and the increase in alternative pay definitions used in Pay for 
Performance discussions, this chapter analyzes the determinants of and the effects on 
Say on Pay support of disclosing alternative pay measures. Results suggest that firms 
that disclose alternative pay measures in their Pay for Performance discussions do so 
for different reasons. Although certain measures are characteristic of opportunistic 
disclosure and others are indicative of informative disclosure, effects on Say on Pay are 
similar yet distinct. There is often a significant positive impact of disclosing additional 
information related to compensation on Say on Pay approval, particularly when 
combating prior poor Say on Pay support. However, the positive impact on Say on Pay 
support is most robust when peer comparisons are shared, providing evidence of the 
value of reporting comparative pay. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Executive Compensation  
 
CEO compensation has attracted significant attention by researchers, media, and 
practitioners in recent years and as stated by Ken Sweet in the Associated Press 
(2013), “CEO pay remains a divisive issue in the U.S” (Murphy, 1999; Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2008; Frydman, 2010; Armstrong, 
Ittner, & Larcker, 2012).  
Theory 
Division arises due to mixed views regarding the appropriateness of executive pay. 
Agency theory suggests that executive compensation is a mechanism which can reduce 
agency problems when set effectively to incentivize managers to act in shareholders’ 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, Fama (1980) posits that the 
competitive labor market, through the threat of termination and replacement, offers the 
only incentive necessary for directors and executives to act in the best interest of 
shareholders. Combining these views, many argue compensation is simply a result of 
efficient contracting in a competitive labor market in which compensation is viewed as 
being directly tied to a key set of economic determinants (Gabaix & Landier, 2008; 
Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 2012; Gabaix, Landier, & Sauvagnat, 2014).  
However, others have claimed that the compensation-setting process is also 
greatly affected by managers with too much power over their boards and their own pay 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 2004; Frydman and Jenter, 
2010; Cianci, Fernando, & Werner, 2012; Murphy, 2013). Specifically, it has been 
proffered that CEO compensation in excess of that justified by standard economic 
determinants is driven by CEO rent extraction (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; 
Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2008). Essentially, many agree that the power the CEO has 
over the board of directors can result in costly agency costs for the firm and its 
shareholders in the form of excess compensation.   
 
 
External Monitoring of Executive Compensation 
 
The literature has shown that firm corporate governance can greatly impact the 
monitoring of compensation and such agency costs (Boyd, 1994; Yermack, 1996; Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Cyert, Kang, & Kumar, 2002; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; 
Faleye, 2007). Armstrong et al. (2012) summarize that “many directors’ lack of 
incentives, skills, or available time to adequately scrutinize proposed CEO pay 
packages, give CEOs in firms with weak governance considerable influence over the 
pay-setting process and compensation outcomes.” In addition to the impact of corporate 
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governance on compensation, evidence of other compensation controls and monitoring 
mechanisms have been provided. Jensen and Murphy (1990) propose that “public and 
private political forces” also impose constraints on compensation and wealth-
performance sensitivity. Murphy (1999) adds to this and states that “third parties such 
as rank-and-file employees, labor unions, consumer groups, Congress, and the media 
affect the type of contracts written between management and shareholders.” Also, most 
recently, Congress has enabled shareholders to directly voice their concerns over 
executive compensation through Say on Pay voting. This dissertation further examines 
the impact of political forces and Say on Pay voting on executive compensation 
outcomes. 
 
Political Sensitivity 
Empirical evidence of political constraints on compensation has been provided in 
the context of influences due to media, regulatory, and union pressures.1 Joskow, Rose, 
and Wolfram (1996) most directly examine the impact of regulatory pressure on 
compensation and find that CEOs of electric companies under greater political pressure 
receive lower compensation suggesting that political pressures constrain the pay levels of 
top executives in heavily regulated industries. The authors conclude, “Economic 
regulation appears to provide an effective mechanism through which public concerns 
about executive compensation can be translated into political and regulatory actions, and 
ultimately into reduced CEO pay.” The first chapter of this dissertation further examines 
the impact of political pressure and scrutiny on executive compensation through 
government contractor firms’ political sensitivity and visibility that arises due to their 
customer-supplier relationships with the federal government. The political cost hypothesis 
proffers that firms subject to government scrutiny take actions to deflect potential 
negative government reactions which can result in increased political costs for the firm 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). This study considers whether the political sensitivity of firms 
that rely on government contracts has an effect on corporate executive compensation 
behavior, specifically levels of excess executive compensation, compensation 
composition, and wealth-performance sensitivity. 
 
Pay for Performance Disclosure and Alternative Measures of Pay 
In addition to external forces impacting compensation, Congress has enabled 
shareholders to directly express their support or lack of support for executive 
                                            
 
 
 
1 For evidence of constraints on compensation due to media pressure, see Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2008. 
For evidence of constraints due to regulatory pressure, see Joskow, Rose, & Wolfram, 1996; Palia, 2000; 
Bryan & Hwang, 1997; Wolfram, 1998; Hadlock, Lee, & Parrino, 2002; Holden & Jolls, 2008; and Cunat & 
Guadalupe, 2009. For evidence of compensation constraints due to union pressure, see Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1991; Gomez & Tzioumis, 2006; and Jiang, Lie, & Que, 2010. 
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compensation through Say on Pay voting. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act mandated the implementation of Say on Pay, a non-binding 
shareholder advisory vote on approval of executive compensation as disclosed in the 
underlying proxy statement.2 Supplemental to Say on Pay, Section 953 of Dodd-Frank 
legislation states that firms are required to disclose “information that shows the 
relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance 
of the issuer.” Although Dodd Frank requires firms to provide Pay for Performance 
disclosure, this has not yet been clarified and mandated by the SEC. The second chapter 
of this dissertation explores the determinants of reporting alternative pay measures that 
have propagated in proxy reporting in response to Dodd Frank legislation and the 
incentive it creates for firms to persuade shareholders that pay presented in the proxy 
statement appropriately reflects corporate performance. This study also examines the 
impact on Say on Pay outcomes of reporting common alternative pay measures in Pay 
for Performance discussions.  
 
  
                                            
 
 
 
2 Although these are non-binding votes, there are potential repercussions. Negative vote outcomes may 
lead to increased attention from investors, proxy advisor services, and the popular press (Ferri and 
Maber, 2013). In addition, failing say on pay can result in shareholder initiated lawsuits, risk of loss of re-
election for directors, and ultimately changes to executive compensation (Larcker, McCall, & Tayan 2011; 
Illiev and Vitanova 2013; Ertimur, Muslu, and Ferri 2011). 
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CHAPTER I 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND POLITICAL SENSITIVITY: 
EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 
5 
 
  
Abstract 
Using federal contractor data, this paper examines the political costs hypothesis through 
the impact of government scrutiny and political sensitivity on executive compensation. 
The political cost hypothesis proffers that firms subject to government scrutiny take 
actions to deflect potential negative government reactions which can result in increased 
political costs for the firm. Results suggest that government contractor firms with the 
most political sensitivity (i.e., firms with government contracts that are most visible and 
comprise significant portions of their revenue) pay lower total (and excess) 
compensation to their CEOs, but with larger portions of cash, leading to lower long-term 
CEO wealth performance sensitivity. However, politically sensitive contractors with 
significant bargaining power (due to concentration, competition, or political 
contributions), are actually paid greater excess compensation than other politically 
sensitive firms. These findings provide insight into the effects and limitations of 
additional government monitoring of executive compensation.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to maximize shareholder value, firms must consider a variety of stakeholders in 
their decision making. When a firm maintains a supplier-customer business relationship 
with a government agency, a level of firm political visibility and sensitivity arises due to 
the stakeholder-customer position of the government. The literature on politically 
sensitive firms is based on the premise that the political visibility of a firm can result in 
greater government, media, and watchdog group scrutiny. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) first developed the political cost hypothesis based on this notion. The political 
cost hypothesis proffers that firms subject to government scrutiny take actions to deflect 
potential negative government reactions which can result in increased political costs for 
the firm. Using government contract data, Mills, Nutter, and Schwab (2013) extend the 
political cost hypothesis to the federal contractor setting and provide evidence of these 
political costs through their finding that the most politically sensitive contractors, those 
with the largest contracts that make up significant portions of their revenue, pay higher 
taxes. The authors conclude that this is strategic to deflect negative government 
attention in order to protect government contract revenues because loss of the contracts 
would be devastating for those firms that rely heavily on government revenue. This 
study extends the work of Mills et al. (2013) to consider whether the political sensitivity 
of firms that rely on government contracts has an effect on corporate executive 
compensation behavior, specifically levels of excess executive compensation, 
compensation composition, and wealth-performance sensitivity. 
Increased political sensitivity can have an impact on executive compensation 
through a variety of channels. Federal union and watchdog groups are active in their 
oversight of government contractors and, among other initiatives, have successfully 
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urged support for laws reducing the cap on taxpayer-funded contracting compensation 
costs in recent years.3 The sentiment was explained in a quote by the Executive 
Director of the National Employment Law Project,4  
“While middle-class paychecks have been stagnant for decades, and 
roughly 40 percent of federal contract workers are struggling to get by on 
less than a living wage, it is a simple matter of fairness that taxpayers 
should not be expected to foot the bill for exorbitant CEO salaries for 
private contractors."  
Groups such as the Center for Media and Democracy, the Project of Government 
Oversight, and the Center for Effective Government regularly criticize contractors for 
their compensation through press releases, disparaging comparisons, and reports such 
as one released in 2014 entitled, “Exposed: America’s Highest Paid Government 
Workers” which highlights the compensation of the CEOs of six large corporations that 
receive federal government contracts. When discussing the 2012 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) order to review escalating executive compensation 
reimbursed with taxpayer dollars, Representative Tonko stated,5  
“Reigning in the costs associated with executive compensation in federal 
contracts has the potential to save American taxpayers billions of dollars 
each year…Examining the excessive costs of executive compensation on 
federal contracts is a necessary oversight role of Congress in order to 
make more prudent and responsible decisions going forward.”  
In addition, government contractors have long been the subject of many 
executive orders in which presidents exercise their power over a part of the economy 
they directly control. In 2014 alone, President Obama signed into law three executive 
orders related to compensation at government contractor firms. The first raises the 
minimum wage to $10.10 for all employees of government contractor firms, the second 
bars federal contractors from retaliating against employees who discuss their pay in an 
attempt to close the gender pay gap, and the third requires contractors to provide 
compensation data based on sex and race.6  Executive orders like these enable 
presidents to bypass Congress to impose rules on a vast array of the private sector that 
                                            
 
 
 
3 See popular press: O’Keefe & Censer (2012), Moore (2012), Mazmanian (2014), and Office of 
Management and Budget (2013). Prior to 12/26/13, compensation costs billed as part of government 
contracts were capped using a benchmarking formula. The new federal budget signed into law on 
12/26/13 included a provision that caps federal reimbursement of compensation at $487,000 annually. In 
2012, the prior cap was $952,308. Prior annual caps are published by the Office of Management and 
Budget. 
4 See Center for Effective Government Press Release: “Groups Call on Congress to Rein in Excessive 
Compensation of Defense Department Contractors” dated 10/18/2012. 
5 See House of Representatives Press Release, “GAO Asked to Review Escalating Executive 
Compensation of Federal Contractors”, dated Nov 20, 2012. 
6 See Goldfarb (2014) and Kuhnhenn (2014) for coverage of recent executive orders directed at the 
compensation of government contractors. 
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receives taxpayer money and therefore, falls directly under the control of government 
mandate. In fact, the government contractor market is so expansive that it is estimated 
that government contractors include up to a quarter of the U.S. workforce and receive 
nearly half a trillion contract dollars annually.7  
However, the effect of political sensitivity on executive compensation may be 
impacted by the bargaining power of the government contractor firm. According to 
Porter’s (1980) competitive strategy theory, bargaining power is shifted from the 
purchaser to the supplier based on certain market conditions related to concentration 
and competition. Government contractor bargaining power can vary based on these 
same conditions. In fact, Mills et al. (2013) suggest that the bargaining power of a 
government contractor can increase due to the contractor being one of a limited number 
of qualified contractors available or due to the specialized nature of the contract itself. 
Specifically, the authors contend that the percentage of firm annual contracts not 
subject to competition8  proxies for the bargaining power of the government contractor 
firm by representing the limiting of the availability of substitutes, the increasing of 
switching costs, and the maximizing of the importance of the supplier’s products to the 
government. Similarly, the percentage of firm annual defense contracts can increase the 
bargaining power of the contractor because defense contractors are thought to provide 
vital, specialized inputs that few firms have the capability to provide (Mills et al., 2013). 
Contractor bargaining power may also be impacted by industry concentration which can 
limit the availability of substitutes as well as through political campaign contributions 
which has been linked to increased contract awards (Witko, 2008). These sources of 
bargaining power may mitigate the impacts of political sensitivity by effectively shielding 
contract revenues.       
Given the increased scrutiny surrounding compensation in recent years and the 
additional oversight inherent in being a government contractor, this study investigates 
the interaction of political sensitivity with agency theory on compensation. The purpose 
of this paper is to investigate the following questions. First, do politically sensitive firms 
that rely on government contracts pay lower levels of total and excess executive 
compensation to protect contract revenues and thus, their bottom line? Does the 
political sensitivity of a firm impact the incentive structure of its executive 
compensation? Finally, does a firm’s bargaining power affect the impact of political 
sensitivity on its executive compensation behavior?  
To address these questions, the analysis is performed on a sample of 4,173 
federal government contractor firm-years for the years 2000 through 2011, representing 
                                            
 
 
 
7 See Kuhnhenn (2014) and Ivory (2014) for estimates on the size of the government contracting 
workforce. 
8 The Fedspending.org database of federal contracts identifies contracts not subject to competition as 
those that involved a unique supplier, required specific research and development or other expert 
services, were authorized by statute, were follow-on contracts, were urgent, or pertained to U.S. national 
security.  
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704 unique firms. Contracting data utilized, released under the Federal Funding 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, is housed on Fedspending.org. Rather 
than reporting the total amount of a multiyear contract won during a year, the database 
includes federal contract awards for the amount of contract goods and services ordered 
and obligated by the government on an annual basis. Measures of political sensitivity 
and bargaining power are adapted from Mills’ et al. (2013). Political sensitivity is a 
composite measure that incorporates both the visibility of contracts and the importance 
of the contracts to the contractor firm. Contract visibility is proxied for using the size or 
amount of firm annual government contract dollars while contract importance is proxied 
for using the percentage of firm annual revenues derived from federal contracts. As 
Mills’ et al. explain, political sensitivity is defined as “the joint effect of a firm having 
contracts that are large enough to attract government scrutiny and important enough to 
the firm to motivate changes in behavior.”  
Based on the prior literature and its support of the costs of government scrutiny, 
government contractors with greater political sensitivity are predicted to pay less excess 
CEO compensation to deflect scrutiny that could lead to negative government reactions 
and the loss of contract dollars. For these firms, government scrutiny may serve as a 
monitoring device for executive compensation. This government monitoring may benefit 
shareholders by effectively reducing excess compensation or it may harm shareholders 
by inefficiently reducing incentive alignment between managers and shareholders. To 
examine these conflicting effects the impacts of increased political sensitivity on the 
structure of CEO compensation and on the wealth-performance sensitivity of 
government contractor CEOs are also examined.  
Consistent with the political cost hypothesis, results suggest that government 
contractor firms with the most political sensitivity, that is those with the most visible 
government contracts that make up significant portions of their revenue, pay lower total 
as well as excess compensation to their CEOs. In fact, firms with the most visible 
contracts, i.e., those at the 90th percentile or above, pay $1.3 million less in residual 
(excess) compensation than less sensitive government contractors ($0.7M versus 
$2.0M). However, residual (excess) compensation also varies greatly within the highly 
visible group with how important the contracts are to the firm. Moving from the 25th 
percentile of contract importance to the firm to the 75th percentile among contractors 
with the most visibility, decreases (unexplained) excess compensation (from positive to 
negative) by over $1 million. In addition to lower total and excess compensation, these 
politically sensitive firms compensate their CEOs with larger portions of cash 
compensation and smaller portions of equity compensation, coupled with lower wealth-
performance sensitivity.  
Finally, evidence is provided that the negative relation between political 
sensitivity and excess executive compensation is warranted through analysis linking 
contracts awarded to prior excess compensation paid. This suggests that firms do, in 
fact, receive less contract awards when prior paid excess compensation is greater. 
Additional results reveal that politically sensitive firms are also effective at avoiding at 
least some negative attention associated with executive compensation through their 
Say on Pay results. Politically sensitive government contractors actually receive less 
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Say on Pay criticism for excess executive compensation compared with other 
government contractor firms, suggesting that politically sensitive government 
contractors are effective at structuring their compensation in a way that minimizes 
external criticism. 
In further analysis, the impact of bargaining power on the relation between 
political sensitivity and executive compensation is examined. The results indicate that 
politically sensitive firms with significant bargaining power, proxied for by the portion of 
firm annual contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts, the portion of firm 
annual contract dollars not subject to competition, the Herfindahl industry concentration 
index, the portion of the industry comprised of government contractors, or firm political 
campaign contributions, do not experience the same magnitude of decrease in excess 
compensation. This suggests that the effects of political sensitivity can be mitigated by 
bargaining power. In fact, politically sensitive government contractors with significant 
bargaining power actually pay greater excess compensation. This indicates that some 
government contractors hold enough bargaining power to completely offset their 
compensation-related political costs as illustrated by the lack of relation between excess 
compensation paid and contracts awarded for this subsample. 
This is the first paper to empirically investigate the relationship between political 
sensitivity and executive compensation by extending the political cost hypothesis to the 
context of executive compensation for government contractor firms. First, these findings 
provide broadened perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation while 
revealing an additional mechanism of stakeholder compensation monitoring in the form 
of increased government scrutiny due to political sensitivity. Also, the results provide 
insight into the limitations of this additional oversight due to firm bargaining power. 
Finally, these results offer evidence of the potential impact of the government’s role in 
the private sector through the growing federal contracts market and compensation 
legislation. As the federal contracting market continues to grow, the government’s reach 
is lengthened and, echoing the conclusions reached by Joskow et al. (1996), as the 
legislated visibility of executive compensation increases for all firms, the political 
sensitivity of all firms may increase as well. 
 
 
Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
 
Executive Compensation 
CEO compensation has attracted significant attention due to its divisive nature and the 
conflict between agency theory and entrenchment theory (Murphy, 1999; Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2008; Frydman, 2010; Armstrong, 
Ittner, & Larcker, 2012). Agency theory suggests compensation is simply a result of 
efficient contracting in a competitive labor market. Accordingly, many argue 
compensation is directly tied to a key set of economic determinants and is set effectively 
to incentivize managers to act in shareholders’ interests (Gabaix & Landier, 2008; 
10 
 
Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 2012; Gabaix, Landier, & Sauvagnat, 2014). However, others 
have claimed that the compensation-setting process is also greatly affected by rent 
extraction of entrenched managers with too much power over their boards and their own 
pay (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; 
Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Cianci, Fernando, & Werner, 2012; Murphy, 2013). Consistent 
with this view, researchers find support of CEO rent extraction in compensation through 
the use of socially connected board members (Hwang & Kim, 2009), peer group 
selection (Faulkender & Yang, 2010; Bizjak, Lemmon, & Nguyen, 2011), compensation 
consultants (Armstrong, Ittner, & Larcker, 2012), campaign contributions (Aslan & 
Grinstein, 2012), and political lobbying (Skaife, Veenman, & Werner, 2013; Sobel & 
Graefe-Anderson, 2014) among other practices. Essentially, many agree that the power 
the CEO has over the board of directors can result in costly agency costs for the firm 
and its shareholders in the form of excess compensation.   
The literature has shown that firm corporate governance can greatly impact the 
monitoring of compensation and such agency costs. Armstrong et al. (2012) summarize 
that “many directors’ lack of incentives, skills, or available time to adequately scrutinize 
proposed CEO pay packages, give CEOs in firms with weak governance considerable 
influence over the pay-setting process and compensation outcomes.” The authors find 
that weaker corporate governance, proxied for using multiple measures of board of 
director characteristics and board charter rules, is associated with higher levels of 
excess compensation. Similarly, others have found that CEO compensation is impacted 
by board control (Boyd, 1994), ownership characteristics (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 
1999; Cyert, Kang, & Kumar, 2002; Hartzell & Starks, 2003), and board characteristics 
(Yermack, 1996; Core et al., 1999; Faleye, 2007) among other factors.9  
In addition to the impact of corporate governance on compensation, evidence of 
compensation monitoring in many other forms has been supported. Jensen & Murphy 
(1990) propose that “public and private political forces” also impose constraints on 
compensation and wealth-performance sensitivity. Murphy (1999) adds to this and 
states that “third parties such as rank-and-file employees, labor unions, consumer 
groups, Congress, and the media affect the type of contracts written between 
                                            
 
 
 
9 Boyd (1994) finds that CEO compensation increases with CEO duality and total director compensation 
but decreases with board stock ownership, insider ratio, and board representation by ownership groups. 
Core et al. (1999) show that increased CEO compensation is associated with CEO duality, larger boards, 
greater percentage of outside directors, greater percentage of grey directors, and older and busy 
directors. However, decreased CEO compensation is associated with increased CEO ownership and the 
presence of a blockholder. Cyert et al. (2002) conclude that equity ownership of the largest external 
shareholder and equity ownership of the BOD are strongly negatively related to the size of CEO equity 
compensation. Similalrly, Hartzell & Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership concentration is 
positively related to executive pay-performance sensitivity and negatively related to the level of executive 
compensation. Yermack (1996) concludes that small boards provide stronger CEO performance 
incentives through compensation. Finally, Faleye (2007) suggests that classified boards entrench 
management and insulate them from market discipline leading to increased executive compensation. 
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management and shareholders.” Empirical evidence of such political constraints on 
compensation has been provided in the context of influences due to media pressure 
(Core et al. 2008), regulatory pressure, and union pressure.  
Joskow, Rose, and Wolfram (1996) is one of the first papers to examine 
regulatory pressure on compensation. In their analysis, the authors find evidence of 
political constraints on executive compensation by proxying for political pressure using 
measures related to the local business, regulatory, and political environments as well as 
customer characteristics. Without making statements about the welfare effects of 
political constraints on executive compensation, the authors find that CEOs of electric 
companies under greater political pressure receive lower compensation. They conclude 
that political pressures constrain the pay levels of top executives in heavily regulated 
industries. Specifically, the authors state, “Economic regulation appears to provide an 
effective mechanism through which public concerns about executive compensation can 
be translated into political and regulatory actions, and ultimately into reduced CEO pay.” 
Furthermore, they suggest that legislative efforts to increase the visibility of CEO 
compensation may further increase the political pressures on CEOs across all 
industries. Related research has also found support for the political constraints of 
regulated industry executive compensation resulting in CEOs with lower quality 
education (Palia, 2000; Hadlock, Lee, & Parrino, 2002) who are paid with like 
compensation characteristics including lower total compensation as well as lower 
wealth-performance sensitivity (Bryan & Hwang, 1997; Wolfram, 1998; Holden & Jolls, 
2008; Cunat & Guadalupe, 2009).  
Similarly, other studies have theorized and documented that the increased 
political attention brought on by unionization constrains compensation resulting in lower 
total executive compensation and often, lower wealth-performance sensitivity as well 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1991; Gomez & Tzioumis, 2006; 
Jiang, Lie, & Que, 2010). In addition, despite research suggesting the positive impacts 
of politically connected firms (Faccio, 2002; Faccio, 2010; Faccio, Masulis, & 
McConnell, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2007; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013)10, Yu 
(2010) finds evidence of the effects of political constraints, in the form of sensitivity 
arising due to politically connected Taiwanese boards, resulting in both lower levels and 
lower wealth-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. The author concludes 
                                            
 
 
 
10 Faccio (2002; 2010) find that firms with a politically connected controlling shareholder or top manager 
benefit from easier access to debt financing, lower taxation, and stronger market power. The strength of 
these benefits vary with the level of country corruption and economic development. However, despite 
significant benefits the author finds that these firms still under-perform their peers. Further, Faccio, 
Masulis, & McConnell (2006) find that politically connected firms benefit from increased likelihood of being 
bailed out. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2007) find that firms with politically connected board members 
experience an increase in firm value when the associated political party is in presidential power. In 
addition, firms experience a positive abnormal stock return in response to the announcement of a 
politically connected director nomination. Finally, Goldman et al. (2013) find that politically connected 
firms benefit from increased procurement contracts when their associated political party is in power. 
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that this can have negative consequences for the alignment of interests between 
shareholders and management. Others have investigated the political use of the 
corporate tax code to influence executive-pay decisions and find that although the tax 
policy may not be completely effective in curbing pay, it is more effective when political 
costs are greater (Perry & Zenner, 2001; Rose & Wolfram, 2000; Rose & Wolfram, 
2002; Balsam & Yin, 2005).  
 
Politically Sensitive Firms 
In addition to evidence of political constraints on compensation, other financial 
constraints have been documented in the literature on politically sensitive firms. This 
literature has stemmed from the political cost hypothesis, first developed by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986). Watts and Zimmerman propose that the political and regulatory 
process, a competition for both positive and negative government wealth transfers 
(Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), results in government scrutiny for firms and this 
scrutiny has an effect on accounting choices. Specifically, the political cost theory 
proffered by Watts and Zimmerman predicts that firms take actions to avoid government 
scrutiny that may potentially result in costly negative government reactions. Watts and 
Zimmerman offer examples of this type of politically-motivated corporate behavior 
including government lobbying, social responsibility campaigns in the media, and 
selection of accounting procedures to minimize reported earnings in an effort to stay 
below the radar.  
The political cost hypothesis has been the foundation for significant empirical 
research. Most commonly, this research has revolved around the impacts of 
government scrutiny on firms’ accounting choices in the form of downward earnings 
management, choice of accounting methods, voluntary disclosure behavior, and 
corporate tax treatment. For example, Cahan (1992) offers support for the political cost 
hypothesis in his finding that discretionary accruals are lower when firms are under 
increased government scrutiny due to an antitrust investigation. Jones (1991) also finds 
that firms manage earnings downward due to the political costs that arise in an import 
relief investigation. Similarly, Han and Wang (1998) find that oil companies used 
accruals to reduce reported earnings, and thus reduced political sensitivity, during the 
1990 Persian Gulf crisis and Key (1997) finds that cable companies also reported 
reduced earnings during cable industry deregulation.  
In addition to earnings management, many studies have focused on the effects 
of political sensitivity on other discretionary accounting decisions. Daley and Vigeland 
(1983) conclude that larger firms expense R&D costs, rather than capitalizing, to avoid 
government scrutiny and political costs while Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981) find 
that political costs induce firms to capitalize, rather than expense, interest. Raffournier 
(1995) utilizes a sample of Swiss firms and their voluntary disclosures in their annual 
reports to propose that larger firms voluntarily disclose more information in an effort to 
minimize political costs. This result has been illustrated by the voluntary disclosure of 
auditor-provided tax service fees (Bedard et al., 2010), social responsibility disclosure 
(Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Ghazali, 2007), and compensation disclosure (Conyon, 
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Mallin, & Sadler, 2002; Hill, Shelton, & Stevens, 2002; Meek, Rao, & Skousen, 2007; 
Taylor, Darus, & Liu, 2008). 
 
Government Contractors 
Government contractors represent a special type of firm that may be susceptible to the 
effects of political sensitivity due to their supplier relationships with the government. 
These firms compose a large portion of all industries of the U.S. economy and have 
historically received significant government, media, and watchdog attention due to the 
government-taxpayer customer role (Mills et al., 2013). Theoretically, federal contracting 
is often viewed in a principal-agent context as well as from an efficient contracting 
perspective. The principal-agent context of federal contracting highlights potential 
conflicts of interest between contractor firms, their management, politicians, and the 
public. In addition, this perspective unveils the possibility of the threat of political 
intervention as a mechanism of political influence on firm decision making (Witko, 
2011). This notion of political influence was also proposed by Agapos and Dunlap 
(1970) in their model of the government–industry relationship in which they theorize that 
in addition to the standard desire of the contractor to maximize profits and the 
government’s aim to minimize costs, the relationship is also affected by political 
pressures.  
Much of the related empirical literature has focused on only one segment of 
government contractors, that of defense contracts. Most of these studies have targeted 
contractor profitability (Weidenbaum, 1968; Agapos & Gallaway, 1970; Stigler & 
Friedland, 1971; Bohi, 1973; Lichtenberg, 1992; McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002; Zhong & 
Gribbin, 2009)11 or contractor accounting manipulation and fraud (Thomas & Tung, 
1992; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999)12.  Notably, in their analysis of defense contract 
procurement fraud, Karpoff et al. (1999) introduce the notion that firms that depend on 
government contracts for a substantial portion of their revenue may bear higher 
potential costs of government disfavor. Although this result was particularly strong 
among smaller contractors, there was no evidence of this relation when the firm was 
ranked as one of the Top 100 Defense Contractors. Similarly, Salbador and Vendrzyk 
(2006) also analyze Top 100 Defense Contractors and conclude that market power 
significantly impacts a firm’s ability to capture the benefits of tax preferences for 
government contractors. These results highlight the advantage inherent in contractor 
clout. 
                                            
 
 
 
11 While Weidenbaum (1968), Lichtenberg (1992), and McGowan & Vendrzyk (2002) find evidence of 
excessive defense contractor returns, Agapos & Gallaway (1970), Bohi (1973), and Zhong & Gribbin 
(2009) do not. Stigler & Friedland (1971) find evidence of high defense stock returns for a segment of 
their sample period but this relationship does not hold over time. 
12 Thomas & Tung (1992) provide evidence of contractor cost shifting in their analysis of pension costs 
while Karpoff et al. (1999) examine defense procurement fraud.  
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Bargaining power, such as that arising from defense contractor clout, may 
originate from several sources and has been shown to be an important determinant of 
the outcome of a government-contractor relationship. Agapos and Gallaway (1970) first 
consider the impact of contractor bargaining power in their analysis of wartime 
aerospace supplier returns and find that although defense contractors do not 
experience higher profitability during increased defense activity, contractors do have 
sufficient bargaining power to render the Renegotiation Board ineffective in regulating 
the profitability of the industry. In addition to bargaining power stemming from defense 
contractor clout, Mills et al. (2013) suggest that the bargaining power of a government 
contractor can increase due to the contractor being one of a limited number of qualified 
contractors available or due to the specialized nature of the contract itself. The literature 
has also found contractor bargaining power to be increased through the use of political 
donations and connections.13 These results shed light on some of the effects of varied 
forms of bargaining power that affect the complicated political process inherent in 
government contracting. 
Most recently, building on the premise of the political nature of contracting, Mills 
et al. (2013) developed their own measure of political sensitivity and examined its effect 
on the tax treatment of government contractors. Political sensitivity is a composite 
measure that takes into account both the size of contracts and their importance to firm 
revenue. In their analysis of government contractor firms, the authors find support for 
the political cost hypothesis and conclude that government contractors with greater 
political sensitivity incur greater taxes due to the political costs of maintaining contract 
revenues. However, the relation between political sensitivity and effective tax rates is 
tempered, and possibly even reversed, when contractor bargaining power is 
considered. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
Continuing this research, this study evaluates the constraints on compensation 
associated with the political sensitivity of government contractor firms using Mills’ et al. 
composite measure of political sensitivity. Despite the research on the effects of political 
payments and pressure on executive compensation in regulated industries and in 
politically-connected firms, the impact of political sensitivity on executive compensation, 
due to the receipt of taxpayer funds arising from the consumer role of government, has 
not yet been examined. Based on the prior literature and its support of the costs of 
government scrutiny, the study investigates the hypothesis that government contractors 
                                            
 
 
 
13 Witko (2011) finds that government contractor firms benefit from campaign contributions through both 
increased contracts and better information about the contracting process. Similarly, Goldman, Rocholl, & 
So (2013) find that corporate government contracts increase when boards are connected to the party in 
power, supporting Luechinger & Moser’s (2012) conjecture that positive market reactions to executive 
political appointments may be due to the perceived possibility of increased contract procurements. 
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with greater political sensitivity will pay less excess CEO compensation to deflect 
scrutiny that could lead to negative government reactions that result in the loss of 
contract revenue.  
H1: Government contractor firms with greater political sensitivity pay lower 
levels of excess CEO compensation. 
For these firms, government scrutiny may serve as a monitoring device for 
excess executive compensation or it may restrict efficient compensation contracting. If 
political sensitivity acts as an effective monitoring device for executive compensation, 
one may expect greater incentive alignment between the manager and shareholders 
through increased CEO long-term wealth-performance sensitivity as well as through an 
increased portion of equity compensation. However, if less politically sensitive 
government contractor executives are paid an inefficiently high level of equity pay, then 
effective political sensitivity monitoring may result in a decrease in executive wealth-
performance sensitivity and in the equity component of compensation. Without an 
accepted measure of expected equity compensation, it is difficult to make conclusions 
on the consequences of the impact of political sensitivity monitoring on wealth-
performance sensitivity and compensation composition.   
Despite the difficulties in assigning merit to the direction of impact, the literature 
does theorize that there are political costs inherent in equity pay. The political costs of 
equity-based pay were first acknowledged by Jensen and Murphy (1990). They 
recommended that firms increase wealth-performance sensitivities regardless of the 
“political costs” in order to maximize firm value by increasing the alignment between 
CEOs’ and shareholder’s interests. However, despite their recommendation, Yu (2010) 
hypothesizes and finds support of political constraints on equity-based pay. The author 
concludes that high equity-based pay contradicts the government’s goal of maintaining 
social harmony due to the highly scrutinized nature of equity-based compensation. Yu 
(2010) explains that “from the government’s perspective, the level of CEO equity-based 
compensation is determined by a function of social harmony and shareholders’ interests 
and not by a function of shareholders’ interests only.” Given the evidence, the study 
investigates the hypothesis that firms with greater political sensitivity will be more 
susceptible to the political costs of equity-based compensation, thus reducing wealth-
performance sensitivity and impacting the structure of compensation.  
When examining the incentive structure of executive compensation, it is 
important to consider wealth-performance sensitivity in addition to current compensation 
structure because the level of incentives is systematically underestimated when only 
focusing on current pay (Frydman 2008). In addition to their current pay, many 
executives have substantial, existing stock and option holdings in their firm, which 
directly tie considerable portions of their wealth to their firm’s stock price performance.  
H2: The compensation structure of CEOs of government contractor firms 
will be impacted by the firm’s political sensitivity. 
H3: The wealth-performance sensitivity of CEOs of government contractor 
firms will be impacted by the firm’s political sensitivity. 
Finally, given the literature’s recognition of the significance of bargaining power in 
the context of both executive compensation and politically sensitive government 
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contractors, it is predicted that the compensation levels, structures, and performance 
sensitivities of government contractor firms with significant bargaining power will be 
impacted less by political sensitivity. 
H4: Government contractor bargaining power will mitigate the effects of 
political sensitivity on CEO compensation.  
 
 
Data & Methodology 
 
To address these questions, contracting data released under the Federal Funding 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 is utilized. This data covers the period 
beginning in fiscal year 2000 and is housed on Fedspending.org. Intended to increase 
transparency and accountability in government contracting, the database includes 
federal contract awards for the amount of contract goods and services ordered and 
obligated by the government per year. Contracts are aggregated at the firm level on a 
government fiscal year basis and then firms are matched to Compustat following the 
methodology of Mills et al. (2013).14 Finally, each match is hand-checked for accuracy 
and only exact matches are retained. In addition, stock return data are collected from 
CRSP, compensation data and CEO characteristics are collected from ExecuComp, 
institutional ownership data are collected from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(13F) data, governance board characteristics and CEO ownership data are collected 
from RiskMetrics, voting results are collected from Voting Analytics, and the managerial 
ability index is collected from Demerjian et al. (2012) to proxy for skill. 
Dependent variables related to compensation levels, composition, and 
performance-sensitivities are utilized in the analysis. To consider the impact of political 
sensitivity on the level of CEO compensation, the natural logs of total CEO 
compensation and excess CEO compensation (Core et al., 2008) are used. Total CEO 
compensation is measured as the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other 
compensation.15 Excess CEO compensation is calculated as the difference between 
expected and actual compensation using the methodology of Core et al. (2008).  
Accordingly, expected CEO compensation is a fitted value using the resulting 
coefficients from a cross-sectional regression of CEO total compensation on CEO 
tenure, prior year sales, prior year book-to-market ratio, current and prior years’ stock 
returns, current and prior years’ ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 inclusion, and year and 
                                            
 
 
 
14 First, contractor firms are matched to Compustat based on only the first five letters of each name. Then, 
SAS text-matching algorithms are utilized in which only matches where SAS function spedis (Compustat 
name, contractor name) is less than 11 and SAS function complev (Compustat name, contractor name) is 
less than 3. Each match is hand-checked and only exact matches are retained.  
15 This is referred to as TDC1 in ExecuComp. 
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two digit SIC industry fixed effects for the ExecuComp universe over the sample 
period.16   
Compensation structure is analyzed through the proportions of total 
compensation that are comprised of cash and equity. Cash compensation includes 
salary and bonus, and equity compensation includes the total value of restricted stock 
granted, the total value of stock options granted, and long-term incentive payouts. 
Finally, wealth-performance sensitivity is defined as the change in the value of the 
CEO’s firm-specific wealth from direct stock holdings and options for a one thousand 
dollar change in firm market value as calculated by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and 
Biggerstaff (2014)17: 
 
𝑊𝑃𝑆𝑖 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝+∑ ∆∗𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 *  $1,000              (1) 
The political sensitivity measure, the main explanatory variable of interest, is 
adopted from Mills’ et al. (2013). First, Contract Visibility is measured as the total dollar 
amount of federal contracts for each individual government contractor firm in each year 
and High Visibility is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s Contract Visibility is in 
the top decile of all firms’ Contract Visibility in a given year. Government contractor firms 
are only included in the sample when they have non-zero contracts for the year. 
Contract Importance to the firm is measured as the ratio of federal contract dollars the 
firm receives to its total revenues. Finally, Political Sensitivity is the product of High 
Visibility and Contract Importance taking into account both the size and visibility of 
contracts as well as their importance to the firm. Firm Bargaining Power is proxied for in 
a number of ways. The proportion of firm defense contract dollars to total firm annual 
contract dollars, the proportion of firm contract dollars that were not subject to 
competition to total firm annual contract dollars (Mills et al., 2013), the Herfindahl 
industry concentration index, the proportion of the industry comprised of government 
contractors, and firm political campaign contributions are all considered. 
Given the link between weak corporate governance and excess compensation in 
the literature, the study controls for several measures of board characteristics and firm 
culture that have been shown to impact corporate governance and executive 
                                            
 
 
 
16 All analysis is robust to excess compensation calculated using only the government contractors 
sample. 
17 Each CEO’s option-grant sensitivity is measured using calculated individual Deltas in which Delta is the 
sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to stock price. Each Delta is calculated on the basis of fiscal year end 
stock price, time to expiration, strike price, 3-year average dividend yield, and the standard deviation of 
monthly returns over the prior 60 months. Then each Delta is multiplied by the number of underlying 
shares and these are summed to calculate the total Delta of the option portfolio. The measure is 
interpreted as extra dollars of compensation for every one thousand additional dollars of firm value or 
shareholder wealth. 
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compensation. In addition to Core’s et al. (2008) compensation determinants of CEO 
tenure, firm sales, book-to-market ratio, stock returns, ROA, S&P 500 inclusion, and 
year and industry fixed effects, the standard deviation of firm returns is included to 
control for changes in compensation associated with firm risk due to the steady nature 
of government revenue. The entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009) is utilized to 
proxy for shareholder rights restrictions and includes indicators for staggered boards, 
limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements for 
mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden 
parachute arrangements. To proxy for monitoring and oversight, the percentage of 
independent directors on the board (Core et al., 1999; Aslan & Grinstein, 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2012), the percentage of grey directors on the board (Core et al., 
1999), and institutional ownership (Hartzell & Starks, 2003) are included. CEO power 
and incentive alignment are proxied for using CEO ownership (Mehran, 1995; Core et 
al., 1999) and a CEO/Chair duality indicator (Boyd, 1994; Core et al., 1999; Armstrong 
et al., 2012). The literature has found that stronger corporate governance is associated 
with a greater percentage of independent directors, institutional ownership, and CEO 
ownership. On the other hand, weaker governance is associated with higher e-index, 
greater percentage of grey directors, and when there is CEO-Chair duality. Finally, 
executive skill is controlled for as a determinant of excess CEO compensation using 
Demerjian’s et al. (2012) manager ability index.18  
The sample construction process yields a sample of 4,173 federal government 
contractor firm years for the years 2000 through 2011, representing 704 unique firms. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. There are significant differences between 
those government contractors with the most political sensitivity and those with less. The 
highly politically sensitive sample is comprised of much larger firms with average market 
cap and revenue of nearly $31 billion and $26 billion, respectively, compared to average 
market cap and revenue of nearly $9 billion and $7 billion, respectively, of other 
government contractors. Similarly, over 60% of the politically sensitive sample is 
comprised of S&P 500 firms where less than 30% of the government contractor control 
sample are S&P 500 firms. Although there are not significant differences in annual stock 
returns between the two groups, politically sensitive contractors have significantly 
greater ROA and significantly lower risk as measured by standard deviation of returns. 
                                            
 
 
 
18 To calculate this measure, Demerjian et al. first estimate total firm efficiency within industries using data 
envelopment analysis, where efficient firms are those that generate more revenues from a given set of 
inputs including Cost of Goods Sold, Selling and Administrative Expenses, Net PP&E, Net Operating 
Leases, Net Research and Development, Purchased Goodwill, and Other Intangible Assets. Then, this 
efficiency measure is regressed on key firm-specific characteristics expected to aid or hinder 
management’s effort including firm size, market share, positive free cash flow, and firm age, and complex 
multi-segment and international operations. The residual of this regression is used to enable total 
efficiency to be partitioned between the firm and the manager to estimate manager ability, or MA Score 
as termed by Demerjian et al. This score is published by the authors on an annual basis. However, it has 
a limited sample size due to its dependence on a variety of inputs. 
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These firms also have greater total compensation including greater levels of salary and 
bonus. However, on average their pay is comprised of a lower percentage of cash 
compensation. Although these firms receive both greater total and size-industry 
adjusted compensation on average, their excess compensation is significantly less than 
other government contractor firms. In addition, these firms are characterized by larger 
boards with a higher percentage of independent directors and a lower percentage of 
inside directors.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the contracts covered in the 
government contractor sample. The average government contractor in the sample 
receives 540 contracts per year for total annual contracts of $68.2 million (Contract 
Visibility). Of these contracts, 48% are derived from defense contracts and 38% are not 
subject to competition. In addition for those government contractors with positive 
political campaign contributions, the annual average is just over $250,000. The range 
for the portion of firm annual contract dollars to firm revenue is highly skewed; although 
the average firm’s contracts comprise only 1.8% of its revenues (Contract Importance), 
contracts comprise nearly 40% of firms’ revenues at the 99th percentile. Since Political 
Sensitivity is the interaction of Contract Importance with being in the top decile of 
Contract Visibility, this variation in Contract Importance creates a wide range in the top 
decile of Political Sensitivity with values ranging from 0.1% at the 90th percentile to 
39.1% at the 99th percentile. 
The size of contracts has grown significantly over time and therefore, the range 
of contract dollars in the sample varies greatly over the sample period, beginning at an 
average of $36.2 million in 2000 at the start of the sample period and peeking at an 
average of $88.5 million in 2010. As shown in panel C of Table 2, the government 
contractor sample covers a wide range of industries with Business Equipment and 
Manufacturing making up the greatest proportions of the sample with approximately 
25% and 14% respectively. These industries are strongly reflected in the politically 
sensitive sample of government contractors as well, representing approximately 21% of 
the sample each. The sample of government contractor firms is diverse and includes 
firms ranging from The Cheesecake Factory to Lockheed Martin Corporation.  
 
 
Multivariate Results 
 
The Impact of Political Sensitivity on Compensation Levels 
To test H1 and the impact of political sensitivity on total and excess CEO compensation, 
excess compensation must first be calculated. Table 3 presents the cross-sectional 
regressions used to compute excess compensation. Following the methodology of 
Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008), the natural log of total compensation is regressed on 
the natural log of CEO tenure, the natural log of prior year sales, an indicator for S&P 
500 inclusion, prior year’s book-to-market ratio, current and prior years’ annual stock 
returns, current and prior years’ ROA, and year and SIC 2-digit industry fixed effects 
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using eq. (2). The provided coefficients are used to calculate expected (fitted) 
compensation and the difference between actual and expected compensation is the 
proxy used for excess compensation. 
(2) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽5
∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑆&𝑃 500𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
The first column of Table 3 presents the coefficients produced by Core et al. 
(2008). In column 2, the coefficients are developed using Core’s model for the 
ExecuComp universe for the updated sample period of 2000 through 2011. In column 3, 
the coefficients are developed using only the government contractor sample. Consistent 
with Core et al. (2008), in the second column total compensation is positively and 
significantly related to sales, current and lagged annual returns, and S&P 500 
membership while it is negatively and significantly related to BTM and current and 
lagged ROA. When restricting the sample to government contractor firms, the relations 
between total compensation and current annual returns, current ROA, and lagged ROA 
lose their significance. However, results using excess compensation are robust to either 
measure of excess compensation. 
Table 4 considers the determinants of total compensation for government 
contractors using Core’s et al. (2008) controls, the standard deviation of returns as a 
proxy for firm risk, and measures of political sensitivity, bargaining power, and their 
interaction as illustrated in eq. (3). Year fixed effects are included in each specification. 
Industry fixed effects are also included with the exception of models focusing on 
industry concentration as proxies for bargaining power. Each of the five specifications 
corresponds to a separate measure of bargaining power. In the first column, bargaining 
power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars not subject to 
competition, in the second column, it is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual 
contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts, the Herfindahl industry 
concentration index is used in the third column, in the fourth column it is proxied for 
using firm political campaign contributions, and finally, in the fifth column bargaining 
power is proxied for using the proportion of the industry that is comprised of government 
contractors.  
(3) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑙. (2008)  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
                 
In each of the five specifications in Table 4, corresponding to each measure of 
bargaining power, there is evidence that government contractors with the greatest 
political sensitivity pay less in total CEO compensation as evidenced by a significant 
and negative coefficient on political sensitivity. This relation is mitigated when the 
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politically sensitive contractor has significant bargaining power proxied for using the 
percentage of contracts not subject to competition. When political sensitivity is 
interacted with bargaining power, measured as the percentage of contract dollars not 
subject to competition, the coefficient is significant and positive, suggesting that 
bargaining power, in the form of contract dollars derived from non-compete bids, 
reduces the decline in total compensation that arises from increased political sensitivity. 
It is worth noting that this is not the case when bargaining power is measured in other 
ways suggesting the impact of different forms of bargaining power may vary. However, 
industry concentration (HHI) does enter negatively and significantly while HHI2 enters 
positively and significantly. This is consistent with the literature and illustrative of the 
hyperbolic relation between industry concentration and CEO total compensation 
(Graboyes, 2010).  
Similarly, Table 5 focuses on the impact of political sensitivity on excess 
compensation, measured as residual compensation using the ExecuComp universe and 
the resulting coefficients from column 2 of Table 3. In each of the five columns of Table 
5, corresponding to each measure of bargaining power, excess compensation is 
regressed on measures of political sensitivity and bargaining power, their interaction, 
the standard deviation of returns as a proxy for firm risk, market cap, and year fixed 
effects. Industry fixed effects are also included with the exception of models focusing on 
industry concentration as the proxy for bargaining power. In Tables 6, 7, and 8 the 
manager ability score, the E-Index, and the percentage of grey directors are included as 
additional controls, as illustrated in eq. (4).19  
(4) 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽5
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽7 ∗ % 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽8
∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
                                                    
In support of H1, results suggest that in addition to total compensation, the most 
politically sensitive government contractors also pay less excess compensation. In all 
but one of the regressions in Table 5, the impact of political sensitivity on excess 
compensation is significant and negative. Similarly, when governance controls are 
added in Table 6, a continued negative and significant impact of political sensitivity is 
                                            
 
 
 
19 Table 7 repeats this analysis where the dependent variable is excess compensation measured as 
residual compensation using only the government contractor sample and the resulting coefficients from 
column 3 of Table 3. The results for political sensitivity and measures of bargaining power are robust to 
both measures of excess compensation with the exception of industry concentration. Table 8 repeats the 
analysis where the dependent variable is excess compensation calculated as the difference between a 
firm’s total compensation (TDC1) and median total compensation for its corresponding size tercile in its 2 
digit SIC industry group. While political sensitivity remains significant in some specifications, bargaining 
power does not when using industry and size adjusted compensation. 
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observed in four out of five specifications.20 In fact moving from the 90th percentile of 
political sensitivity to the 99th percentile reduces excess CEO compensation by as 
much as $2.0 million compared with the benchmark government contractor firm.21 
However, in support of H3, when political sensitivity is interacted with four out of five 
proxies used for bargaining power, the coefficient is significant and positive. This 
suggests that government contractors with greater political sensitivity are associated 
with less excess compensation but this relation is mitigated when these politically 
sensitive contractors have large percentages of defense contracts, large percentages of 
contracts not subject to competition, greater industry concentration, or significant 
political campaign contributions.  
For example, a firm with political sensitivity in the 99th percentile and bargaining 
power in the 75th percentile, as measured by industry concentration, has average 
excess compensation of only $759,000 less than the average government contractor 
firm.22 Similarly, when bargaining power is measured as the percentage of contract 
dollars derived from defense, the average excess compensation of a firm with political 
sensitivity in the 99th percentile and bargaining power in the 75th percentile is only 
$573,000 less than the average government contractor firm compared with $2.0 million 
less than average for firms in the 99th percentile of political sensitivity without any 
contracts derived from defense.23 In fact, politically sensitive government contractors 
                                            
 
 
 
20 When bargaining power is proxied for using the proportion of the industry comprised of government 
contractors, neither bargaining power or political sensitivity are significant. 
21   Moving from the 90th percentile of political sensitivity (the beginning of the politically sensitive sample) 
to the 99th percentile based on column 1 of Table 6: 
-$1,353,690 = (β1, Table 6, Column 1) * [(PoliticalSensitivity, P99) - (PoliticalSensitivity, P90)]  
=  -3,471 * (0.3913 - 0.0013) 
   Moving from the 90th percentile of political sensitivity to the 99th percentile based on column 2 of Table 6: 
-$2,014,350 = (β1, Table 6, Column 2) * [(PoliticalSensitivity, P99) - (PoliticalSensitivity, P90)]  
=  -5,165 * (0.3913 - 0.0013) 
Moving from the 90th percentile of political sensitivity to the 99th percentile based on column 3 of Table 6: 
-$1,505,400 = (β1, Table 6, Column 3) * [(PoliticalSensitivity, P99) - (PoliticalSensitivity, P90)]  
=  -3,860 * (0.3913 - 0.0013) 
Moving from the 90th percentile of political sensitivity to the 99th percentile based on column 4 of Table 6: 
-$1,176,390 = (β1, Table 6, Column 4) * [(PoliticalSensitivity, P99) - (PoliticalSensitivity, P90)]  
=  -3,016 * (0.3913 - 0.0013) 
22   Excess compensation for political sensitivity in 99th percentile and bargaining power (% Defense) at 
the 75th percentile based on column 3:  
-$759,236 = (The baseline excess comp for a firm in the 99th percentile of Political Sensitivity from 
Footnote #21) + (β3, Table 6, Column 3) * (Political Sensitivity, P99) * (Bargaining Power, P75)  
= -1,505 + (5,647 * .3913 * .3375) 
23 Excess compensation for political sensitivity in 99th percentile and bargaining power (% Defense) at 
the 75th percentile based on column 2:  
-$573,064 = (The baseline excess comp for a firm in the 99th percentile of Political Sensitivity from 
Footnote #21) + (β2, Table 6, Column 2) * (Bargaining Power, P75) + (β3, Table 5, Column 6) * (Political 
Sensitivity, P99) * (Bargaining Power, P75)  
= -2,014 + (-1,341 * .9220) + ( 7,421 * .3913 * .9220) 
23 
 
with significant bargaining power may actually pay greater excess compensation. For 
example, the average excess compensation of a firm with political sensitivity in the 99th 
percentile and bargaining power in the 75th percentile, as measured by the percentage 
of contract dollars not subject to competition, is actually $1.1 million more than the 
average government contractor firm compared with $1.4 million less than average for 
politically sensitive firms without any contracts not subject to competition.24 In support of 
H1, this indicates that firms generally pay less excess compensation to their CEO when 
contracts are large and comprise an important component of firm revenues consistent 
with increased government and media scrutiny. However, in support of H4, firms with 
more bargaining power, do not pay as much less excess compensation as a result of 
political sensitivity, and in fact, may even pay more in excess compensation. 
 
The Impact of Political Sensitivity on Compensation Structure 
To test H2 and the impact of political sensitivity on the structure of CEO compensation, 
the cash ratio and equity ratio are used as dependent variables. First, Table 9 considers 
the impact of political sensitivity on the structure of pay through the proportion of total 
compensation comprised of cash. The cash ratio is regressed on political sensitivity, 
bargaining power, and the interaction between bargaining power and political sensitivity 
while controlling for CEO tenure, CEO ownership, firm sales, ROA, BTM, standard 
deviation of returns, S&P 500 inclusion, and governance controls including institutional 
ownership, E-Index, and the percentage of grey directors as illustrated in eq. (5). As 
before, each model specification corresponds to a measure of bargaining power. 
(5) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽5
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑃500 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽9
∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11 ∗ % 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽12
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
                             
                                            
 
 
 
24 Excess compensation for political sensitivity in 99th percentile and bargaining power (% Non-Compete) 
at the 75th percentile based on column 1:  
$1,101,011 = (The baseline excess comp for a firm in the 99th percentile of Political Sensitivity from  
Footnote #21) + (β3, Table 6, Column 1)*(Political Sensitivity, P99) * (Bargaining Power, P75) 
= -1,354 + (8,765 * .3913 * .7158)  
Excess compensation for political sensitivity in 99th percentile and bargaining power (% Defense) at the 
75th percentile based on column 4:  
$6,757,211 = (The baseline excess comp for a firm in the 99th percentile of Political Sensitivity from 
Footnote #21) + (β2, Table 6, Column 4) * (Bargaining Power, P75) +  (β3, Table 5, Column 8)*(Political 
Sensitivity, P99) * (Bargaining Power, P75)  
= -1,176 + (-0.0035 * $340,422) + ( 0.0685 * .3913 * $340,422) 
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In support of H2, it is evident that government contractors with greater political 
sensitivity are paid greater portions of cash compensation given the significant and 
positive coefficient on political sensitivity in all but the third and fifth columns. When 
proxying for bargaining power using the HHI industry concentration index or the 
proportion of the industry comprised of government contractors, political sensitivity loses 
its significance in this model. This preference for cash compensation is tempered when 
political sensitivity is interacted with bargaining power, measured by the percentage of 
defense contracts. However, this is not the case when bargaining power is proxied for in 
other ways. This suggests that politically sensitive contractors are associated with larger 
portions of cash compensation unless a large portion of their contracts are derived from 
defense. 
Similarly, Table 10 further examines the impact of political sensitivity on the 
structure of pay through the proportion of compensation comprised of equity. In Table 
10, the firm’s CEO compensation equity ratio is regressed on political sensitivity, 
bargaining power, and the interaction between bargaining power and political sensitivity 
while controlling for CEO tenure, CEO ownership, firm sales, ROA, BTM, standard 
deviation of returns, S&P 500 inclusion, and governance controls including institutional 
ownership, E-Index, and the percentage of independent directors as illustrated in eq. 
(6). 
(6) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽5
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑃500 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽9
∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐸 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11 ∗ % 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽12
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
                         
Similar to previous results, in four of the five specifications (corresponding to the five 
proxies of bargaining power) of Table 10, political sensitivity is negatively and 
significantly associated with the equity portion of compensation. This indicates that 
those government contractors with the greatest political sensitivity pay compensation 
composed of significantly lower portions of equity. In addition, this relation is not 
affected by the bargaining power of the contractors. This preference for greater portions 
of cash compensation and lower portions of equity compensation provides support for 
H2 and the political limitations on equity based pay. 
The Impact of Political Sensitivity on CEO Wealth-Performance Sensitivity 
Finally, in Table 11 wealth-performance sensitivity is also regressed on political 
sensitivity, bargaining power, and the interactions between political sensitivity and 
bargaining power while controlling for CEO tenure, firm sales, ROA, BTM, stock returns, 
standard deviation of returns, and year and industry fixed effects as illustrated in eq. (7). 
Each column of Table 11 corresponds to a measure of contractor bargaining power. 
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(7) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽5
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀
+ 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
                  
There is some evidence that the most politically sensitive government contractors are 
characterized by lower CEO compensation wealth-performance sensitivity indicated by 
negative and significant coefficients of political sensitivity in columns 2 and 4, providing 
support for H3. This relation is mitigated when the politically sensitive contractor has 
significant bargaining power in terms of contracts derived from defense and political 
campaign contributions. Taken together with prior results, this suggests that firms 
subject to greater government and watchdog scrutiny due to their highly visible 
government contracts are paid less in total and excess compensation than their less 
sensitive, government contractor peers. However, these sensitive contractors appear to 
be compensated for lower pay through smaller portions of at-risk pay and greater 
portions of cash compensation leading to lower long-term wealth performance 
sensitivity. These relations are weakened when the politically sensitive contractor has 
significant bargaining power to protect their future contract revenues. 
 
 
Supplemental Analyses 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
To address the confounding effects of covariates that predict both executive 
compensation and the probability of being classified as politically sensitive, analysis 
based on matched propensity scores is utilized. Table 12 tabulates the resulting 
coefficients from the estimation of the propensity score for the likelihood of being 
included in the politically sensitive sample based on CEO tenure, firm sales, BTM, 
annual return, ROA, percentage of contracts derived from defense, standard deviation 
of returns, year, and industry. As shown in Table 12, while tenure, sales, ROA, and 
percentage of contracts derived from defense are positively and significantly linked with 
politically sensitive government contractor firms, BTM and firm risk (standard deviation 
of returns) are negatively and significantly linked with political sensitivity.  
Politically sensitive government contractors are matched to the government 
contractor control group using propensity score matching techniques. Table 13 presents 
results illustrating the impact of political sensitivity on excess compensation, 
compensation composition, and wealth-performance sensitivity based on propensity 
score matched analysis. In the first specification, kernel matching is utilized in which all 
observations are included but each control observation is weighted based on its 
propensity score’s proximity to the treatment observation’s propensity score. With kernel 
matching, a statistically significant, negative relation is observed between political 
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sensitivity and excess executive compensation.25 In addition, there is evidence that 
political sensitivity is also negatively and significantly related to total compensation and 
wealth-performance sensitivity. Similarly, when utilizing stratification matching in which 
treatment observations are only matched to control observations with propensity scores 
within the same optimal block of propensity scores based on block mean propensity 
scores, a statistically significant, negative relation is observed between political 
sensitivity and excess executive compensation. There is also a negative relation 
between political sensitivity and the portion of equity-based compensation providing 
further evidence of prior results. 
 
Excess Compensation as a Determinant of Government Contract Awards 
If the observed impact of political sensitivity on excess compensation levels is a result of 
government contractors who are heavily dependent on large contracts changing their 
behavior to protect future revenue, one would expect CEO excess compensation to 
significantly impact the receipt of future contract awards. Table 14 presents results 
illustrating this impact in which contract awards are regressed on prior year excess 
compensation, the natural log of firm sales, the percentage of firm revenue comprised of 
contract awards (contract importance), political campaign contributions, and year and 
industry fixed effects using eq. (8).  
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗  𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) 𝑡−1 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡−1
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
In the first two columns of Table 14, the level of contract awards is used as the 
dependent variable. In the third column, the change in contract awards is utilized. 
Finally, in the fourth column the probability of crossing the 90th percentile of contract 
awards for the first time (i.e. entering the politically sensitive sample) is examined. As 
predicted, there is a statistically significant negative relation between prior year excess 
compensation and future contract awards providing further evidence that government 
contractors pay less excess compensation to protect future contract revenue. Although, 
a significant impact is not observed when considering the change in contracts awarded, 
there is a negative and significant relation between prior excess compensation and the 
likelihood of entering the politically sensitive sample. These results illustrate why 
politically sensitive contractors might be motivated to structure their compensation 
practices in a way that minimizes external criticism.  
                                            
 
 
 
25 Results for excess compensation are robust to being calculated using both the ExecuComp universe as 
well as using only the government contractor sample. This is true for both kernel and stratification 
matching. 
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 In Table 15, the sample is restricted to contractors with above mean levels of 
bargaining power to examine the robustness of the relation between excess 
compensation paid and future contracts received when a firm has significant bargaining 
power. In the first specification, contractors are restricted to those with above mean 
proportions of contracts not subject to competition. In the second column, contractors 
with above mean proportions of contracts derived from defense are represented. 
Finally, in the last column, bargaining power is proxied for using contractors with above 
mean political donations. There is a negative relation between the change in excess 
compensation paid and contracts awarded in the second specification. However, there 
is not a significant impact of the level of excess compensation paid on future contracts 
awarded when contractors have significant bargaining power as shown in each 
specification. This provides evidence of the mitigating impact of contractor bargaining 
power on the compensation costs associated with political sensitivity. 
 
Political Sensitivity and Negative Publicity 
Finally, if politically sensitive contractor firms aim to structure their compensation 
practices in a way that minimizes external criticism, this may be reflected in their Say on 
Pay results. In Table 16, there is evidence that politically sensitive firms are successful 
in avoiding at least some negative publicity through their Say on Pay results. Say on 
Pay approval is regressed on prior year’s Say on Pay support, political sensitivity, 
excess compensation, the interaction between political sensitivity and excess 
compensation, the equity percentage of pay, annual stock return, standard deviation of 
returns, and year and industry fixed effects using eq. (9). 
(9) 
𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
+ 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
When these firms pay excess compensation, they are criticized less than similar firms. 
As expected, excess compensation is negatively and significantly related to Say on Pay 
results. However, this negative impact is lessened when the government contractor is 
highly politically sensitive as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction of political sensitivity with excess compensation. This suggests that politically 
sensitive government contractors are effective at structuring their compensation in a 
way that minimizes at least some external criticism. 
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Conclusion 
 
In support of the political costs hypothesis, this analysis provides evidence of the 
constraints on compensation that arise due to the political sensitivity of government 
contractor firms. Specifically, results suggest that firms generally pay less excess 
compensation to their CEO when contracts are large and comprise an important 
component of firm revenues. This is consistent with firms altering their behavior to save 
contract revenues due to the threat of increased government and media scrutiny. 
However, firms with greater bargaining power do not pay as much less excess 
compensation as a result of political sensitivity, and in fact, may even pay more in 
excess compensation. Furthermore, in support of the political costs of equity 
compensation, these politically sensitive firms compensate their CEOs with larger 
portions of cash compensation and smaller portions of equity compensation, coupled 
with lower long-term wealth-performance sensitivity, regardless of the amount of 
contractor bargaining power. 
These findings are important for a number of reasons. First, they provide 
additional perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation while revealing 
an additional mechanism of compensation stakeholder monitoring in the form of 
increased scrutiny due to political sensitivity. The findings also provide insight into the 
limitations of this additional oversight that arises due to effects of contractor bargaining 
power. In addition, the results add to the literature that considers the importance and 
impact of the government’s role in the private sector through the growing federal 
contracts market. Finally, it is worth noting, as discussed by Joskow et al. (1996), that 
legislative efforts to increase the visibility of executive compensation may increase the 
political sensitivity, and thus compensation constraints, of firms in all industries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for government contractor sample, 2000-2011 
Firm characteristics, including Market Cap (in millions), S&P 500 indicator, Revenue (in 
millions), ROA, BTM, and Annual Returns are collected from Compustat and CRSP. 
Tenure, age, and compensation measures (in thousands) including salary, bonus, cash 
compensation, equity compensation, and total compensation are collected from 
ExecuComp. Expected and excess compensation are computed using the methodology 
of Core et al. (2008). Excess compensation (govt) is computed using only the sample of 
government contractors. Governance measures including G-Index, E-Index, CEO 
duality, CEO ownership, board size, independent, inside, and grey board members are 
collected from RiskMetrics. Ability Score is collected from the Managerial Ability Index of 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Institutional ownership is calculated using Thompson 13-f data. 
The table reports a two-tailed t-test for differences in the means of the two groups.  
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  Politically Sensitive Contractor Firms   Government Contractor Control Firms 
 N Mean Median P10 P90  N Mean Median P10 P90 
            
Market Cap  420 30,825.40*** 7,696.79 782.66 97,464.75  3753 8,927.49 1,872.22 304.05 16,966.88 
S&P 500 420 62.86%*** 1.00 0.00 1.00  3753 29.44% 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Revenue  420 25,641.12*** 11,062.85 764.77 67,307.50  3753 6,586.18 1,505.37 241.10 13,931.00 
Log(Sales) 420 9.11*** 9.31 6.64 11.12  3753 7.43 7.32 5.49 9.54 
BTM  420 0.67* 0.67 0.37 0.96  3747 0.69 0.70 0.32 1.01 
ROA 420 5.65%*** 5.33% 1.02% 11.48%  3753 2.84% 3.92% -4.37% 11.54% 
Annual Return 420 11.78% 9.13% -29.04% 51.58%  3753 13.48% 7.34% -40.88% 65.71% 
Std Dev of Returns 420 9.18%*** 7.91% 4.14% 15.16%  3753 11.74% 9.97% 4.92% 20.16% 
            
CEO Salary 420 1,017.02*** 971.91 554.17 1,566.35  3753 732.77 675.00 363.46 1,107.20 
CEO Bonus  420 1,030.01*** 0.33 0.00 3,125.00  3753 561.62 0.00 0.00 1,368.68 
CEO Total Comp 420 9,457.24*** 6117.51 1,485.10 20,065.09  3753 5,987.64 3,302.17 882.45 12,013.69 
Expected Comp 420 8,755.52*** 6594.73 2,145.51 20,525.51  3753 4,042.05 2,943.00 1,431.74 7,912.19 
Excess Comp 420 701.72*** 68.91 -5,462.47 6,371.73  3753 1,945.59 163.98 -1,741.14 5,165.24 
Δ in Excess Comp 373 36.38% -19.06% -215.07% 242.52%  3249 167.19% -33.10% -290.23% 198.80% 
Excess Comp (govt) 420 1,371.21* 224.95 -3,603.30 7,237.73  3753 2,092.05 178.50 -1,649.52 5,425.83 
Ind & Size Adj Comp 420 2,701.11*** 558.88 -3,149.19 9,954.87  3753 1,604.06 0.00 -2510.09 4,749.72 
Cash Ratio 420 31.40%*** 24.28% 9.01% 61.68%  3753 37.60% 30.11% 10.21% 83.91% 
Equity Ratio 420 47.77% 52.81% 0.00% 76.60%  3753 45.76% 50.95% 0.00% 79.51% 
CEO Age 393 57.78*** 58.00 50.00 65.00  2971 55.86 56.00 47.00 65.00 
CEO Tenure 420 6.91 4.92 1.29 14.84  3753 7.12 5.25 1.34 15.01 
Ability Index 346 -0.01*** -0.02 -0.14 0.14  2958 0.01 0.00 -0.16 0.19 
Female CEO 393 3.31% 0.00 0.00 0.00  2972 2.32% 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 1. Continued. 
 
           
  Politically Sensitive Contractor Firms   Government Contractor Control Firms 
 N Mean Median P10 P90  N Mean Median P10 P90 
 
           
 
           
G-Index 397 7.29 7.00 5.00 10.00  3141 7.21 7.00 5.00 10.00 
E-Index 397 2.55 3.00 1.00 4.00  3141 2.64 3.00 1.00 4.00 
Number of Directors 392 10.62*** 11.00 7.00 14.00  3028 9.19 9.00 6.00 12.00 
Inside Directors 392 13.33%*** 12.50% 7.69% 21.43%  3028 16.93% 14.29% 9.09% 28.57% 
Grey Directors 392 7.14%*** 0.00% 0.00% 19.05%  3028 8.65% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 
Independent Directors 393 80.88%*** 83.33% 66.67% 91.67%  3001 75.54% 77.78% 57.14% 90.00% 
Dual CEO/Chair 392 53.57%*** 1.00 0.00 1.00  3028 41.94% 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEO Ownership 392 1.51%** 0.37% 0.02% 3.95%  2968 2.08% 0.63% 0.05% 4.23% 
Institutional Ownership 420 72.62% 71.54% 51.03% 96.23%  3742 73.37% 77.67% 42.47% 99.26% 
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Table 2: Government contractor sample by year and industry 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for firm annual government contract dollars 
(Contract Visibility) and firm annual contract dollars as a percentage of firm revenue 
(Contract Importance). In addition, three measures of Bargaining Power are included: 
the percentage of firm annual contract dollars derived from defense contracts, the 
percentage of firm annual contract dollars not subject to competition, and annual firm 
political campaign contributions. Panel B examines contract descriptive statistics by firm-
year. Panel C presents the industry breakdown of the government contractor sample 
compared with the ExecuComp universe based on the Fama-French 12 classification. 
The third column offers the percentage of each industry in the ExecuComp universe that 
is comprised of government contractors. 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A: Government Contract Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  
 N Mean Median P10 P90 
Number of Contracts per Year 4173 540 27 2 750 
Contract Dollars per Year 4173 68,192,274 1,529,918 26,000 68,957,714 
Contract Dollars % of Revenue 4173 1.82% 0.09% 0.00% 2.34% 
Defense Contract Dollars 4173 48.45% 47.17% 0.00% 100.00% 
Contract Dollars Not Subject to Competition 4173 38.07% 24.45% 0.00% 100.00% 
Annual Campaign Contributions (where >0) 782 254,719 167,400 24,249 529,800 
 
 
 
Panel B: Government Contract Dollars by Firm-Year 
 
 N Mean Median P10 P90 
2000 250 36,234,665 1,921,396 46,994 40,225,725 
2001 260 40,871,844 1,607,878 52,915 38,385,387 
2002 276 42,902,032 1,500,871 40,585 46,915,556 
2003 298 46,852,066 1,924,506 47,112 48,664,167 
2004 301 47,133,142 1,638,175 22,398 59,209,038 
2005 335 66,608,668 2,392,433 16,927 79,281,437 
2006 354 68,060,631 1,925,971 13,750 75,690,563 
2007 386 86,546,551 1,552,480 18,600 71,271,618 
2008 446 83,885,458 1,127,680 15,729 80,311,091 
2009 434 88,049,827 1,122,938 20,083 90,776,297 
2010 433 88,484,003 1,350,297 21,781 81,045,476 
2011 400 77,841,530 1,455,745 26,260 90,142,786 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2. Continued. 
 
Panel C: Government Contractor Firms by Industry 
 
 
ExecuComp 
Universe  
Government 
Contractors 
Sample 
Politically 
Sensitive 
Sample 
Government 
Contractors 
in Industry 
   
Consumer NonDurables 5.81% 3.74% 7.38% 13.97% 
Consumer Durables 2.85% 1.77% 0.71% 13.48% 
Manufacturing 12.21% 13.92% 20.48% 24.73% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal  4.24% 0.98% 2.62% 5.02% 
Chemicals 3.07% 2.85% 0.24% 20.14% 
Business Equipment 18.56% 24.99% 20.71% 29.20% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 2.28% 3.67% 5.71% 34.85% 
Utilities 4.91% 9.51% 5.48% 42.06% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 11.51% 9.27% 8.81% 17.48% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 7.53% 9.06% 6.43% 26.10% 
Finance 15.51% 7.84% 10.48% 10.95% 
Other 11.52% 12.39% 10.95% 23.32% 
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Table 3: Excess Compensation Methodology 
The cross-sectional regression used for the calculation of excess compensation using 
the methodology of Core et al. (2008) is presented in columns 2 and 3. In column 2, the 
ExecuComp universe is used while the sample is restricted to the government 
contractor sample in column 3. Column 1 shows Core’s et al. coefficients used to model 
their measure of excess compensation. CEO total compensation (TDC1) and tenure are 
collected from ExecuComp. S&P 500, Sales, ROA, BTM, and Annual Returns are 
collected from Compustat and CRSP. S&P 500 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
firm is included in the S&P 500. Year and industry fixed effects are utilized as well. 
Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated with 
asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Core et al. 
(2008) 
(2) 
ExecuComp 
Universe 
(3) 
Government 
Contractors 
Dependent variable = log(total compensation) 
        
Log(Tenure) -0.02 -0.003 -0.012 
  (-0.416) (-0.508) 
Log(Sales) T-1 0.42*** 0.415*** 0.368*** 
  (60.843) (15.931) 
SP500 0.12** 0.091*** 0.104** 
  (4.530) (2.216) 
BTM T-1 -0.99*** -0.628*** -0.475*** 
  (-17.592) (-4.886) 
Annual Return 0.27*** 0.138*** 0.036 
  (6.362) (1.012) 
Annual Return T-1 0.16*** 0.099*** 0.059* 
  (6.777) (1.821) 
ROA -1.00*** -0.226*** -0.145 
  (-3.004) (-0.926) 
ROA T-1 -0.45** -0.160*** -0.035 
  (-2.592) (-0.324) 
    
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,090 19,241 4,173 
R-squared 0.429 0.375 0.262 
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Table 4: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO Total 
Compensation 
Each column evaluates the impact of political sensitivity on government contractor total 
CEO compensation while considering different measures of bargaining power. In 
column 1, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract 
dollars that are not subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining Power is proxied for 
using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are derived from defense 
contracts. In column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using Herfindahl industry 
concentration. In column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for using firm annual political 
campaign contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage of each 2 digit SIC industry 
group comprised of government contractors is used to proxy for Bargaining Power. 
Political Sensitivity is the interaction of High Visibility (an indicator equal to 1 if a firm’s 
annual contract dollars are in the top decile) and Contract Importance (the portion of a 
firm’s revenue comprised of contracts). Tenure is collected from ExecuComp. S&P 500, 
Sales, ROA, BTM, and Annual Returns are collected from Compustat and CRSP. S&P 
500 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included in the S&P 500. Year and 
industry fixed effects are utilized as well. Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses 
and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for 
political donations and the industry makeup of contractors have been multiplied by 105. 
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Dependent variable = log(total 
compensation) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Political Sensitivity -0.642*** -0.564** -0.444** -0.416*** -0.842** 
 (-3.704) (-2.539) (-2.318) (-3.607) (-2.330) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) 0.036     
 (0.834)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power 0.562**     
 (2.284)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  -0.008    
  (-0.206)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  0.367    
  (1.151)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   -0.659**   
   (-2.551)   
HHI Squared   0.547**   
   (2.210)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   0.572   
   (1.317)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    0.018  
          (1.318)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    0.102  
    (0.930)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -0.403*** 
     (-3.195) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     1.684* 
     (1.682) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) -0.370 -0.355 -0.247 -0.353 -0.432 
 (-1.220) (-1.174) (-0.804) (-1.165) (-1.367) 
      
Year FEs & Core et al. (2008) Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 4,173 4,173 4,173 4,173 4,173 
R-squared 0.263 0.263 0.216 0.264 0.218 
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Table 5: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Excess Compensation (calculated using ExecuComp universe) 
Excess compensation is the dependent variable and is calculated using the 
methodology of Core et al. (2008) with the coefficients produced in Column 2 of Table 3 
using the ExecuComp universe. Specifically, the log of total compensation is regressed 
on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year book-to-market ratio, current and prior years’ 
stock returns, current and prior years’ ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 inclusion, and 
year and two digit SIC industry fixed effects and a fitted value (expected compensation) 
is calculated using the resulting coefficients. Excess compensation is then defined as 
the difference between actual total compensation and expected total compensation. 
Each column evaluates the impact of political sensitivity on government contractor CEO 
excess compensation while considering Bargaining Power. Political Sensitivity is the 
interaction of High Visibility (an indicator equal to 1 if firm annual contract dollars are in 
the top decile) and Contract Importance (the portion of a firm’s revenue comprised of 
contracts). In column 1, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm 
annual contract dollars that are not subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining 
Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are 
derived from defense contracts. In column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using 
Herfindahl industry concentration. In column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for using 
firm annual political campaign contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage of 
each 2 digit SIC industry group comprised of government contractors is used to proxy 
for Bargaining Power. Ability Score is collected from the Managerial Ability Index of 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Governance measures including the E-Index and the 
percentage of grey board members are collected from RiskMetrics. Robust t-statistics 
are provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Dependent Variable = Excess 
Compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(ExecuComp Universe)      
       
Political Sensitivity -4,114*** -1,343 -3,839*** -3,026*** -8,333*** 
 (-5.496) (-1.466) (-2.999) (-3.205) (-2.678) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -579.2     
 (-1.103)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power 5,223***     
 (4.222)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  -1,034*    
  (-1.750)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  64.31    
  (0.038)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   -38.73   
   (-0.018)   
HHI Squared   -140.5   
   (-0.064)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   5,054**   
   (2.021)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    -0.004**  
    (-2.227)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    0.059***  
    (3.353)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -994.0 
     (-0.817) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     18,939** 
     (2.248) 
Market Cap 0.044** 0.045** 0.050*** 0.052** 0.053*** 
 (2.421) (2.444) (2.695) (2.510) (2.816) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) 3,995 4,072 7,474* 3,865 7,671* 
 (0.927) (0.946) (1.761) (0.904) (1.772) 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 4,173 4,173 4,173 4,173 2,579 
R-squared 0.055 0.056 0.038 0.057 0.041 
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Table 6: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Excess Compensation With Governance Controls (calculated using ExecuComp 
universe) 
Excess compensation is the dependent variable and is calculated using the 
methodology of Core et al. (2008) with the coefficients produced in Column 2 of Table 3 
using the ExecuComp universe. Specifically, the log of total compensation is regressed 
on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year book-to-market ratio, current and prior years’ 
stock returns, current and prior years’ ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 inclusion, and 
year and two digit SIC industry fixed effects and a fitted value (expected compensation) 
is calculated using the resulting coefficients. Excess compensation is then defined as 
the difference between actual total compensation and expected total compensation. 
Each column evaluates the impact of political sensitivity on government contractor CEO 
excess compensation while considering Bargaining Power. Political Sensitivity is the 
interaction of High Visibility (an indicator equal to 1 if firm annual contract dollars are in 
the top decile) and Contract Importance (the portion of a firm’s revenue comprised of 
contracts). In column 1, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm 
annual contract dollars that are not subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining 
Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are 
derived from defense contracts. In column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using 
Herfindahl industry concentration. In column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for using 
firm annual political campaign contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage of 
each 2 digit SIC industry group comprised of government contractors is used to proxy 
for Bargaining Power. Ability Score is collected from the Managerial Ability Index of 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Governance measures including the E-Index and the 
percentage of grey board members are collected from RiskMetrics. Robust t-statistics 
are provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Dependent Variable = Excess 
Compensation (ExecuComp Universe) (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) 
      
Political Sensitivity -3,471*** -5,165** -3,860*** -3,016*** -1,368 
 (-2.982) (-2.360) (-2.699) (-3.382) (-0.483) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -535.2     
 (-0.645)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power 8,765**     
 (2.151)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  -1,341*    
  (-1.670)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  7,421**    
  (2.125)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   318.6   
   (0.083)   
HHI Squared   -605.8   
   (-0.168)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   5,647*   
   (1.847)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    -0.004*  
    (-1.880)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    0.069***  
    (3.625)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -1,637 
     (-0.903) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     -333.3 
     (-0.046) 
Market Cap 0.021 0.020 0.034* 0.026 0.033 
 (0.960) (0.933) (1.690) (1.107) (1.608) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) 12,727 12,579* 15,779** 12,297 15,881** 
 (1.640) (1.660) (1.964) (1.622) (1.999) 
E-Index -285.4 -299.0 -233.7 -282.4 -234.5 
 (-0.859) (-0.879) (-0.939) (-0.865) (-0.943) 
Ability Score 3,459* 3,310* 1,525 3,720* 1,838 
 (1.800) (1.725) (0.986) (1.868) (1.187) 
Percent Grey Directors 7,777* 7,571* 7,697* 7,654* 7,741* 
 (1.773) (1.771) (1.929) (1.747) (1.921) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 
R-squared 0.055 0.056 0.034 0.046 0.034 
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Table 7: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Excess Compensation (calculated using Government Contractor sample) 
Excess compensation is the dependent variable and is calculated using the 
methodology of Core et al. (2008) with the coefficients produced in Column 3 of Table 3 
using the government contractor sample. Specifically, the log of total compensation is 
regressed on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year book-to-market ratio, current and 
prior years’ stock returns, current and prior years’ ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 
inclusion, and year and two digit SIC industry fixed effects and a fitted value (expected 
compensation) is calculated using the resulting coefficients. Excess compensation is 
then defined as the difference between actual total compensation and expected total 
compensation. Each column evaluates the impact of political sensitivity on government 
contractor CEO excess compensation while considering Bargaining Power. Political 
Sensitivity is the interaction of High Visibility (an indicator equal to 1 if firm annual 
contract dollars are in the top decile) and Contract Importance (the portion of a firm’s 
revenue comprised of contracts). In column 1, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the 
percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are not subject to competition. In column 
2, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars 
that are derived from defense contracts. In column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for 
using Herfindahl industry concentration. In column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for 
using firm annual political campaign contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage 
of each 2 digit SIC industry group comprised of government contractors is used to proxy 
for Bargaining Power. Ability Score is collected from the Managerial Ability Index of 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Governance measures including the E-Index and the 
percentage of grey board members are collected from RiskMetrics. Robust t-statistics 
are provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Dependent Variable = Excess 
Compensation (Government 
Contractors) (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) (4) 
 
 
(5) 
       
Political Sensitivity -3,539*** -5,420** -3,216** -3,059*** 2.590 
 (-3.066) (-2.500) (-2.297) (-3.456) (0.001) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -476.6     
 (-0.576)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power 8,556**     
 (2.106)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  -1,464*    
  (-1.800)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  7,700**    
  (2.208)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   1,056   
   (0.271)   
HHI Squared   -819.9   
   (-0.224)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   2,533   
   (0.865)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    -0.003*  
    (-1.680)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    0.065***  
    (3.490)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -406.7 
     (-0.223) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     -5,885 
     (-0.820) 
Market Cap 0.036* 0.036* 0.036** 0.041* 0.036* 
 (1.727) (1.692) (1.987) (1.798) (1.943) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) 12,630 12,495* 15,477* 12,295 15,447* 
 (1.628) (1.650) (1.928) (1.622) (1.947) 
E-Index -378.0 -394.1 -357.1 -372.8 -356.9 
 (-1.133) (-1.154) (-1.430) (-1.136) (-1.433) 
Ability Score 3,686* 3,516* 1,914 3,946** 2,123 
 (1.921) (1.835) (1.238) (1.982) (1.373) 
Percent Grey Directors 7,755* 7,529* 6,788* 7,656* 6,798* 
 (1.768) (1.762) (1.723) (1.748) (1.708) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 
R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.030 0.046 0.030 
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Table 8: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Excess Compensation (calculated using Industry and Size Adjusted 
Compensation) 
Excess compensation is the dependent variable and is calculated as the difference 
between a firm’s total compensation (TDC1) and median total compensation for its 
corresponding size tercile in its 2 digit SIC industry group. Each column evaluates the 
impact of political sensitivity on government contractor CEO excess compensation while 
considering Bargaining Power. Political Sensitivity is the interaction of High Visibility (an 
indicator equal to 1 if firm annual contract dollars are in the top decile) and Contract 
Importance (the portion of a firm’s revenue comprised of contracts). In column 1, 
Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that 
are not subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the 
percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts. In 
column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using Herfindahl industry concentration. In 
column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for using firm annual political campaign 
contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage of each 2 digit SIC industry group 
comprised of government contractors is used to proxy for Bargaining Power. Ability 
Score is collected from the Managerial Ability Index of Demerjian et al. (2012). 
Governance measures including the E-Index and the percentage of grey board 
members are collected from RiskMetrics. Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses 
and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Dependent Variable = Excess 
Compensation (Size and Industry 
Adjusted) (1) (2) 
 
 
(3) (4) 
 
 
(5) 
Political Sensitivity -3,208*** -2,000 -1,539 -2,217*** -4,014 
 (-3.057) (-1.166) (-1.077) (-2.603) (-1.364) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -1,057     
 (-1.287)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power 6,523*     
 (1.939)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  -1,257    
  (-1.591)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  1,942    
  (0.648)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   817.2   
   (0.214)   
HHI Squared   -368.7   
   (-0.103)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   -1,198   
   (-0.411)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    0.000  
    (0.247)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    0.027  
    (1.611)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -2,758 
     (-1.579) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     6,683 
     (0.875) 
Market Cap 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 
 (3.767) (3.739) (4.302) (3.436) (4.172) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) 13,855* 13,551* 16,261** 13,875* 16,190** 
 (1.816) (1.819) (2.068) (1.857) (2.082) 
E-Index -392.0 -406.6 -393.1 -373.9 -383.6 
 (-1.218) (-1.233) (-1.634) (-1.178) (-1.597) 
Ability Score 503.6 460.4 -564.6 832.1 -347.3 
 (0.269) (0.246) (-0.375) (0.427) (-0.231) 
Percent Grey Directors 7,790* 7,549* 7,716** 7,857* 7,836** 
 (1.807) (1.798) (1.988) (1.823) (1.998) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 
R-squared 0.083 0.083 0.059 0.082 0.059 
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Table 9: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Compensation Structure - Cash 
The ratio of cash compensation to total compensation is the dependent variable where 
cash compensation includes salary and bonus. Each column evaluates the impact of 
political sensitivity on government contractor CEO cash compensation while considering 
Bargaining Power. Political Sensitivity is the interaction of High Visibility (an indicator 
equal to 1 if firm annual contract dollars are in the top decile) and Contract Importance 
(the portion of a firm’s revenue comprised of contracts). In column 1, Bargaining Power 
is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are not subject to 
competition. In column 2, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm 
annual contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts. In column 3, Bargaining 
Power is proxied for using Herfindahl industry concentration. In column 4, Bargaining 
Power is proxied for using firm annual political campaign contributions. Finally, in 
column 5, the percentage of each 2 digit SIC industry group comprised of government 
contractors is used to proxy for Bargaining Power. Institutional ownership is collected 
from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings. Governance measures including E-Index, 
CEO ownership, and percentage of independent directors are collected from 
RiskMetrics. Tenure is collected from ExecuComp. S&P 500, Sales, ROA, BTM, and 
Annual Returns are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Robust t-statistics are 
provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for political donations and the interaction of donations with 
political sensitivity have been multiplied by 106. 
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Dependent Variable = Cash Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
   
           
Political Sensitivity 0.179** 0.407*** 0.140 0.113* -0.014 
 (2.126) (2.865) (1.371) (1.737) (-0.077) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -0.010     
 (-0.911)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power -0.207     
 (-1.234)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  0.010    
  (0.999)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  -0.438**    
  (-2.456)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   0.018   
   (0.329)   
HHI Squared   0.009   
   (0.166)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   -0.041   
   (-0.190)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    -0.002  
    (-0.111)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    0.158  
    (0.518)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     0.020 
     (0.571) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     0.421 
     (0.850) 
Institutional Ownership -0.130*** -0.127*** -0.149*** -0.128*** -0.150*** 
 (-4.344) (-4.248) (-5.552) (-4.250) (-5.658) 
E-Index -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (-4.411) (-4.475) (-5.038) (-4.460) (-5.028) 
Grey Directors 0.067 0.067 0.071* 0.069* 0.075* 
 (1.639) (1.638) (1.751) (1.669) (1.835) 
CEO Ownership 0.341*** 0.338*** 0.362*** 0.340*** 0.369*** 
 (4.657) (4.597) (4.919) (4.665) (5.015) 
Log(Tenure) 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (6.009) (6.206) (6.020) (5.984) (6.012) 
Log(Sales) -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.038*** 
 (-9.506) (-9.456) (-10.564) (-8.896) (-10.302) 
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Table 9. Continued. 
     
 
Dependent Variable = Cash Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
   
      
SP500 -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.038*** 
 (-3.267) (-3.255) (-3.483) (-3.304) (-3.515) 
BTM 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.218*** 0.200*** 0.214*** 
 (8.978) (8.959) (11.321) (9.046) (11.302) 
ROA 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.246*** 0.214*** 0.240*** 
 (3.848) (3.826) (4.477) (3.836) (4.391) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) -0.140 -0.141 -0.172* -0.142 -0.158* 
 (-1.478) (-1.494) (-1.937) (-1.503) (-1.795) 
      
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 3,124 3,124 3,124 3,124 3,124 
R-squared 0.292 0.293 0.253 0.292 0.253 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Compensation Structure - Equity 
The ratio of equity compensation to total compensation is the dependent variable where 
equity compensation is composed of the total value of restricted stock granted, the total 
value of stock options granted, and long-term incentive payouts. Each column evaluates 
the impact of political sensitivity on government contractor CEO equity compensation 
while considering Bargaining Power. Political Sensitivity is the interaction of High 
Visibility (an indicator equal to 1 if firm annual contract dollars are in the top decile) and 
Contract Importance (the portion of a firm’s revenue comprised of contracts). In column 
1, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars 
that are not subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining Power is proxied for using 
the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts. 
In column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using Herfindahl industry concentration. In 
column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for using firm annual political campaign 
contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage of each 2 digit SIC industry group 
comprised of government contractors is used to proxy for Bargaining Power. 
Institutional ownership is collected from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings. 
Governance measures including E-Index, CEO ownership, and percentage of 
independent directors are collected from RiskMetrics. Tenure is collected from 
ExecuComp. S&P 500, Sales, ROA, BTM, and Annual Returns are collected from 
Compustat and CRSP. Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses and p-values are 
indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for political 
donations and the interaction of donations with political sensitivity have been multiplied 
by 105. 
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Dependent Variable = Equity Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
   
           
Political Sensitivity -0.303*** -0.358* -0.158 -0.198*** -0.360* 
 (-3.596) (-1.742) (-1.263) (-2.807) (-1.896) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -0.005     
 (-0.358)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power 0.289     
 (1.626)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  0.003    
  (0.292)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  0.206    
  (0.815)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   0.080   
   (1.269)   
HHI Squared   -0.145**   
   (-2.238)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   -0.154   
   (-0.607)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    0.034  
    (1.202)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power    -0.568  
    (-1.237)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -0.130*** 
     (-3.468) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     0.400 
     (0.830) 
Institutional Ownership 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.194*** 0.142*** 0.192*** 
 (4.283) (4.222) (6.484) (4.298) (6.528) 
E-Index 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 (1.371) (1.457) (1.353) (1.513) (1.524) 
Independent Directors 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 
 (3.665) (3.599) (3.839) (3.652) (3.821) 
CEO Ownership -0.349*** -0.335*** -0.338*** -0.340*** -0.338*** 
 (-4.148) (-3.983) (-3.926) (-4.079) (-3.939) 
Log(Tenure) -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.030*** 
 (-5.993) (-6.102) (-5.693) (-6.038) (-5.539) 
Log(Sales) 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 (4.233) (4.240) (4.597) (3.857) (4.077) 
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Table 10. Continued. 
      
Dependent Variable = Equity Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
   
      
SP500 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 
 (4.652) (4.705) (4.890) (4.638) (4.813) 
BTM -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.263*** -0.236*** -0.258*** 
 (-9.268) (-9.241) (-11.71) (-9.333) (-11.67) 
ROA -0.330*** -0.329*** -0.355*** -0.330*** -0.351*** 
 (-4.105) (-4.093) (-4.492) (-4.101) (-4.500) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) 0.253** 0.255** 0.386*** 0.257** 0.347*** 
 (2.494) (2.507) (4.010) (2.530) (3.587) 
      
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 3,124 3,124 3,124 3,124 3,124 
R-squared 0.202 0.202 0.159 0.202 0.159 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Relation between Political Sensitivity, Bargaining Power, and CEO 
Wealth-Performance Sensitivity 
Wealth-Performance Sensitivity is the dependent variable and is defined as the change 
in the value of the CEO’s firm-specific wealth from direct stock holdings and options for 
a one thousand dollar change in firm value. Each column evaluates the impact of 
political sensitivity on government contractor CEO wealth-performance sensitivity while 
considering Bargaining Power. Political Sensitivity is the interaction of High Visibility (an 
indicator equal to 1 if firm annual contract dollars are in the top decile) and Contract 
Importance (the portion of a firm’s revenue comprised of contracts). In column 1, 
Bargaining Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that 
are not subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the 
percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts. In 
column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using Herfindahl industry concentration. In 
column 4, Bargaining Power is proxied for using firm annual political campaign 
contributions. Finally, in column 5, the percentage of each 2 digit SIC industry group 
comprised of government contractors is used to proxy for Bargaining Power. Tenure is 
collected from ExecuComp. Sales, ROA, BTM, and Annual Returns are collected from 
Compustat and CRSP. Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses and p-values are 
indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for political 
donations have been multiplied by 105. 
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Dependent Variable = Wealth 
Performance Sensitivity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
   
   
Political Sensitivity -0.916 -1.854*** 0.592 -1.075*** -0.056 
 (-1.321) (-4.571) (0.643) (-2.635) (-0.046) 
Bargaining Power (Non-Compete %) -0.316*     
 (-1.848)     
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power -0.113     
 (-0.131)     
Bargaining Power (Defense %)  0.007    
  (0.042)    
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power  1.777*    
  (1.781)    
Bargaining Power (HHI)   3.285***   
   (3.897)   
HHI Squared   -3.662***   
   (-4.513)   
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power   -4.612***  
 
   (-2.916)   
Bargaining Power (Polit Contributions)    0.012  
    (0.530)  
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power*    0.422*  
    (1.703)  
Bargaining Power (Contractor % of Ind)     -0.113 
     (-0.226) 
Sensitivity*Bargaining Power     -2.293 
     (-0.645) 
Standard Deviation (Returns) 7.627*** 7.628*** 8.621*** 7.622*** 9.067*** 
 (3.512) (3.509) (4.352) (3.508) (4.625) 
Log(Sales) -0.468*** -0.462*** -0.452*** -0.469*** -0.451*** 
 (-8.247) (-8.233) (-9.243) (-7.561) (-9.061) 
BTM 1.228*** 1.257*** 0.814*** 1.251*** 0.707** 
 (3.520) (3.547) (2.999) (3.552) (2.556) 
Annual Return -0.322*** -0.321*** -0.293*** -0.322*** -0.285** 
 (-2.793) (-2.789) (-2.579) (-2.781) (-2.513) 
ROA -0.985 -0.974 -0.990 -0.960 -0.908 
 (-1.189) (-1.174) (-1.176) (-1.157) (-1.091) 
Log(Tenure) -0.220*** -0.223*** -0.231*** -0.218*** -0.218*** 
 (-2.833) (-2.861) (-2.809) (-2.803) (-2.666) 
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Table 11. Continued. 
     
 
Dependent Variable = Wealth 
Performance Sensitivity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
   
      
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes No Yes No 
Observations 4,173 4,173 4,173 4,173 4,173 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.096 0.122 0.093 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Estimation of the Propensity Score 
Propensity scores are developed based on the propensity to be included in the 
politically sensitive sample where the treatment is equal to one if a firm is deemed 
politically sensitive. Tenure is collected from ExecuComp. Sales, ROA, BTM, and 
Annual Returns are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Standard errors are provided 
in parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATION OF THE PROPENSITY SCORE 
 
Treatment: Political Sensitivity   
      
Log(Tenure)  0.066* 
  (0.034) 
Log(Sales) T-1  0.332*** 
  (0.019) 
BTM T-1  -0.235* 
  (0.140) 
Annual Return T-1  -0.014 
  (0.048) 
ROA T-1  1.168** 
  (0.500) 
Defense % of Contracts  0.701*** 
  (0.065) 
Std Dev (Monthly Returns)  -0.971* 
  (0.535) 
   
Matched by Year & Industry  Yes 
   
Observations   4173  
R-squared   0.188 
Standard errors reported in parentheses   
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Table 13: Propensity Score Matched Sample Average Treatment Effects 
Average Treatment Effects are reported for the effect of political sensitivity on excess 
compensation (calculated using both the ExecuComp universe and the government 
contractor sample), total compensation, the cash and equity portions of compensation, 
and CEO wealth performance sensitivity. Propensity scores are developed based on the 
propensity to be included in the politically sensitive sample where the treatment is equal 
to one if a firm is deemed politically sensitive. Year and industry matched propensity 
scores are developed on the basis of tenure, sales, ROA, BTM, annual returns, 
standard deviation of returns, and the percentage of contracts derived from defense. T-
stats are provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Propensity Score Matched Sample Results - Average Treatment Effects of Political Sensitivity 
              
       
  Kernel Matching  Stratification Matching 
  N treatment N control  N treatment N control 
  420 3748  416 3606 
Residual (Excess) Compensation  -1344.28**  -3237.67*** 
  (-1.98)  (-3.16) 
Residual (Excess) Compensation - Govt  -1231.24*  -3101.69*** 
  (-1.92)  (-3.17) 
Ln(Total Compensation)  -0.35***  0.08 
  (-2.88)  (0.55) 
Cash Percentage of Pay  -0.01  -0.00 
  (-0.69)  (-0.06) 
Equity Percentage of Pay  -0.02  -0.04** 
  (-0.83)  (-2.24) 
Wealth Performance Sensitivity  -0.45***  0.01 
  (-2.81)  -0.13 
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Table 14: Relation between CEO Excess Compensation and Future Contract 
Awards 
Contract Awards is the dependent variable and excess compensation is the 
independent variable of interest. It is calculated using the methodology of Core et al. 
(2008). These results are robust to both specifications of excess compensation, based 
on either the ExecuComp universe or the government contractor sample. Specifically, 
the log of total compensation is regressed on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year 
book-to-market ratio, current and prior years’ stock returns, current and prior years’ 
ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 inclusion, and year and two digit SIC industry fixed 
effects and a fitted value (expected compensation) is calculated using the resulting 
coefficients. Excess compensation is then defined as the difference between actual total 
compensation and expected total compensation. Robust t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses and p-values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Coefficients for Ln(Sales)t-1 for Contract Award specifications (columns 1 and 2) have 
been multiplied by 107. Coefficients for Firm Contract Importancet-1 (Contracts/Revenue) 
for Contract Award specifications (columns 1 and 2) have been multiplied by 109. 
 
 
     
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
VARIABLES Contract Awards 
 
 
Δ in 
Contracts 
 
Pr(Becoming 
PS- Top 
Decile) 
        
Excess Compensationt-1 -1,222** -997.1* 0.000 -0.00002** 
 (-2.074) (-1.660) (0.883) (-1.975) 
Δ in Excess Compensationt-1 -112.9 2,936 -0.004 0.000 
 (-0.018) (0.491) (-0.977) (0.737) 
Ln(Sales)t-1 5.123*** 3.575*** 0.957 1.111*** 
 (7.721) (4.539) (1.049) (5.344) 
Firm Contract Importancet-1 (Cntrcts/Rev) 2.158*** 2.144*** -26.04* 50.79*** 
 (5.288) (5.227) (-1.724) (3.432) 
Political Campaign Contributionst-1  323.9*** 0.000 0.000 
  (3.755) (1.012) (1.455) 
     
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,752 2,752 2,752 2,626 
R-squared 0.396 0.415 0.029 0.523 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Relation between CEO Excess Compensation and Future Contract 
Awards when Bargaining Power is High 
Contract Awards is the dependent variable and excess compensation is the 
independent variable of interest. It is calculated using the methodology of Core et al. 
(2008). These results are robust to both specifications of excess compensation, based 
on either the ExecuComp universe or the government contractor sample. Specifically, 
the log of total compensation is regressed on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year 
book-to-market ratio, current and prior years’ stock returns, current and prior years’ 
ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 inclusion, and year and two digit SIC industry fixed 
effects and a fitted value (expected compensation) is calculated using the resulting 
coefficients. Excess compensation is then defined as the difference between actual total 
compensation and expected total compensation. Each specification is limited to the 
sample of contractors with above mean bargaining power. In column 1, Bargaining 
Power is proxied for using the percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are not 
subject to competition. In column 2, Bargaining Power is proxied for using the 
percentage of firm annual contract dollars that are derived from defense contracts. In 
column 3, Bargaining Power is proxied for using firm annual political campaign 
contributions. Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses and p-values are indicated 
with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for Ln(Sales)t-1 have been 
multiplied by 107. Coefficients for Firm Contract Importancet-1 have been multiplied by 
109. 
 
 
 
    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Contract Awards 
 
 
Above Mean Bargaining Power: 
(1) 
 
% Non-
Compete 
(2) 
 
 
% Defense 
 
(3) 
 
 
Donations 
       
Excess Compensationt-1 1,433 -1,526 1,315 
 (1.58) (-1.51) (0.81) 
Δ in Excess Compensationt-1 1,047 -13,500** 736,537** 
 (0.15) (-2.27) (2.10) 
Ln(Sales)t-1 2.80*** 8.60*** 1.55 
 (5.18) (7.64) (1.049) 
Firm Contract Importancet-1 (Cntrcts/Rev) 1.54*** 2.72*** 12.92** 
 (4.07) (4.68) (2.43) 
    
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,138 1,435 204 
R-squared 0.523 0.507 0.849 
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Table 16: Relation between Political Sensitivity, CEO Excess Compensation, and 
Say on Pay Support 
Say on Pay percentage of support is the dependent variable. The interaction of political 
sensitivity and excess compensation is the independent variable of interest. Excess 
compensation is calculated using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). These results 
are robust to both specifications of excess compensation, based on either the 
ExecuComp universe or the government contractor sample. Specifically, the log of total 
compensation is regressed on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year book-to-market 
ratio, current and prior years’ stock returns, current and prior years’ ROA, an indicator 
for S&P 500 inclusion, and year and two digit SIC industry fixed effects and a fitted 
value (expected compensation) is calculated using the resulting coefficients. Excess 
compensation is then defined as the difference between actual total compensation and 
expected total compensation. Robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses and p-
values are indicated with asterisks; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for 
Excess Pay have been multiplied by 105.  
 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Say on Pay Support 
    
Say on Pay Supportt-1 0.168* 
 (1.954) 
Political Sensitivity 0.111 
 (1.508) 
Excess Compensation -0.585*** 
 (-8.165) 
Political Sensitivity * Excess Compensation 0.0001*** 
 (3.599) 
Equity Percentage of Pay -0.052 
 (-1.397) 
Annual Return 0.096** 
 (2.298) 
ROA 0.500* 
 (1.894) 
Std Dev of Returns 0.186 
 (0.718) 
Constant 0.294*** 
 (2.824) 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 312 
R-squared 0.349 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER II 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: IS ALL DISCLOSURE CREATED EQUAL? 
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Abstract  
Given the increase in shareholder scrutiny of executive pay as well as Dodd-Frank 
mandated Say on Pay voting and firm Pay for Performance disclosure, firms have 
significant incentives to communicate their compensation in a manner that maximizes 
shareholder support and minimizes external criticism. This incentive and a lack of 
guidelines provided for Dodd-Frank mandated Pay for Performance disclosure has led 
to an increase in alternative pay definitions used in firm compensation disclosures. 
Firms argue that these measures better represent the relation between pay and 
performance and point to problems with SEC-mandated Summary Compensation Table 
(SCT) calculations representing “pay opportunity” and thus, greatly overstating 
compensation. This paper takes a first look at the most common types of compensation 
disclosure used in Pay for Performance discussions and analyzes the determinants of 
disclosing these measures and their effects on Say on Pay support. Results suggest 
that firms that disclose alternative pay measures in their Pay for Performance 
discussions do so for different reasons. While certain measures are characteristic of 
opportunistic disclosure and others are indicative of informative disclosure, there is 
often a significant positive impact of disclosing additional information related to 
compensation on Say on Pay approval when combating prior poor Say on Pay support. 
However, the impact seems to be most significant when peer comparisons are shared 
providing evidence of the value of reporting comparative pay. 
,  
 
Introduction 
 
Many firms have begun to report supplemental pay measures including “Realized Pay” 
and “Realizable Pay” and use these measures to demonstrate Pay for Performance in 
their proxy statements. Both The Wall Street Journal and Forbes have weighed in on 
the drastic increase of the use of these measures reporting incredible recent growth in 
addition to expected future growth (Chasan, 2012; Ferracone, 2012). In 2015, Equilar 
identified the increase in alternative methods of calculating compensation as a key 
finding in their annual proxy disclosure analysis, citing that the use of realized and 
realizable compensation has grown from only 19% of S&P 100 firms in 2011 to 53% of 
S&P 100 firms in 2014. In support of supplemental pay measures, firms point to 
problems with SEC-mandated Summary Compensation Table (SCT) calculations. Firms 
contend that SCT figures represent “pay opportunity” and can greatly overstate 
compensation as they are dependent on grant-date value calculations of unvested 
grants of stock and stock options. They argue that alternative pay measures better 
represent the relation between pay and performance. This paper provides a first look at 
the propagation of alternative pay measures and investigates the determinates of 
utilizing these measures. Specifically, the study examines whether growth in voluntary 
reporting of these measures in Pay for Performance discussions is associated with 
factors characteristic of opportunistic or informative disclosure. Additionally, the impact 
on Say on Pay results associated with reporting these measures is evaluated. 
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In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was 
mandated and as part of this legislation, Section 953 states that firms are required to 
disclose “information that shows the relationship between executive compensation 
actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer.” Although Dodd-Frank 
requires firms to provide Pay for Performance disclosure, this has not yet been clarified 
and mandated by the SEC. As the definition of “compensation actually paid” is awaiting 
the SEC, many firms and proxy advisor groups have adopted their own measures of 
pay to be used in Pay for Performance disclosures. The two most common alternative 
measures of calculating pay are realized (“pocketed”) and realizable (“market-value”) 
compensation. These measures differ from SCT pay in that “pocketed” pay aims to 
capture cash the executives actually pocketed in a given year while “market-value” pay 
aims to capture a current snapshot of the updated market value of total compensation, 
including outstanding equity compensation awarded in prior years. A third approach, 
“peer comparisons”, utilizes market-value pay to present peer comparison percentile 
rankings. Each of these approaches aims to reflect pay actually received rather than 
potential grant-date value pay.  
However, there are weaknesses inherent in each of these alternative pay 
measures. Because “pocketed” pay captures shares vested and options exercised in 
the year as opposed to grant date values, it is susceptible to fluctuations based solely 
on when an executive chooses to exercise his vested stock options. In addition, it 
includes vested and exercised awards from previous periods and generally does not 
take into account in-progress incentive awards. On the other hand, Pay for Performance 
disclosure using “market-value” pay utilizes current and outstanding stock and option 
awards based on their expected values at the end of the reporting period, rather than 
based on their grant date values. Although this method accounts for changes since the 
granting of the awards, it is sensitive to the valuation methodology which may not 
adequately account for not meeting performance goals, especially for sequential vesting 
contracts. Finally, even though the “peer comparison” group bases its comparisons on 
market-value pay, it only reports relative percentile comparisons of this pay measure. 
The details of each of these three alternative methods of presenting pay in Pay for 
Performance disclosures can vary significantly across firms since there is not a single 
accepted or mandated approach. 
In addition to requiring disclosure on the relation between compensation and 
financial performance, i.e., Pay for Performance, Dodd-Frank mandates the 
implementation of Say on Pay, a non-binding shareholder advisory vote on approval of 
executive compensation as disclosed in the underlying proxy statement. Although these 
are non-binding votes, there are potential repercussions. Negative vote outcomes may 
lead to increased attention from investors, proxy advisor services, and the popular press 
(Ferri and Maber, 2013). In addition, failing say on pay can result in shareholder initiated 
lawsuits, risk of loss of re-election for directors, and ultimately changes to executive 
compensation (Larcker, McCall, & Tayan 2011; Illiev and Vitanova 2013; Ertimur, 
Muslu, and Ferri 2011). These costs of negative voting outcomes create an incentive for 
firms to persuade shareholders that pay presented in the proxy statement is justified 
though appropriately aligning pay with corporate performance.  
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 This paper quantifies the impact of performance, compensation elements, Say on 
Pay results, and other firm and manager characteristics on the probability of voluntarily 
disclosing compensation using one of the three supplemental methods. Although there 
may be benefits to an alternative measure for pay, without mandated methods 
established, it is unclear that these measures offer any incremental information or that 
they are being used to better inform shareholders. This is important because differences 
in how pay is measured affect the comparability and reliability of Pay for Performance 
disclosure. The increase in the reporting of supplemental pay measures and peer 
comparisons may be a result of firms opportunistically aiming to justify to shareholders 
that pay is properly aligned with performance when it is not or it may be a result of firms 
communicating their Pay for Performance relationships in a more informative manner. 
Given the potential impact of Say on Pay on the incentives to voluntarily disclose 
alternative measures and given that additional disclosure is not costless to the firm, this 
study also considers if reporting these measures is beneficial for firms due to its impacts 
on Say on Pay results. Prior literature regarding the disclosure of alternative pay 
measures used in Pay for Performance disclosure has been limited to surveys of the 
characteristics of each, e.g., Larcker, McCall, and Tayan (2011).  
 For the analysis, a hand-collected sample of all S&P 500 firms is utilized for fiscal 
years 2011 through 2013. In order to consider the impact of past Say on Pay results 
which were mandated to begin in 2011, the analysis is restricted to the 2012 proxy 
period and beyond. Three subsamples of different discloser types are examined: 105 
firm proxies that utilize “pocketed” compensation, 91 firm proxies that include “market-
value” compensation, and 67 firm proxies that report “peer comparisons” of percentile 
rankings of market-value compensation in their Pay for Performance discussions. These 
firm-year observations are compared to 1,237 control S&P 500 proxies that do not 
voluntarily disclose alternative supplemental pay measures in Pay for Performance 
discussions. 
 Results suggest that firms disclose varying alternative pay measures for different 
reasons and that these disclosures are not created equal. Although all three sets of 
disclosers are associated with prior poor Say on Pay support, firms that report pocketed 
pay are also characterized by poor operating performance as well as large, increasing 
SCT pay but lower pocketed pay, compared with non-disclosers. Taken together, these 
results indicate these firms are opportunistically disclosing “pocketed” pay to minimize 
criticism of high SCT compensation following poor performance when the optics of 
“pocketed” pay are beneficial. Although firms that report market-value pay are 
associated with lower market value of outstanding equity pay and higher SCT pay 
compared with non-disclosers, they are also associated with lower excess 
compensation, which is inconsistent with opportunistic disclosure. Similarly, peer 
comparison reporters are related to factors associated with informative reporting; they 
are characterized by significantly less excess compensation than peer S&P 500 firms 
and are not influenced by performance or the beneficial optics of compensation 
measures compared with SCT pay.  
 These differences in determinants of reporting alternative pay measures are 
reflected in their varied effects on Say on Pay votes. Both the pocketed pay reporters 
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and market value reporters continue to experience significantly less Say on Pay support 
than non-reporter S&P 500 peers. However, peer comparison reporters receive 
significantly greater increases in Say on Pay support from the prior vote resulting in Say 
on Pay support that is no longer significantly different from peer firms, illustrating the 
benefit provided through the use of peer comparisons to justify compensation. Also, 
while there is a significant positive impact of disclosing peer comparisons and pocketed 
pay on the level of support for Say on Pay, reporting pocketed pay is not enough to 
increase the likelihood of getting past the 70% approval threshold, on average. 
However, when interacted with prior poor Say on Pay support as evidenced by receiving 
less than 70% approval in the prior year, reporting pocketed pay does decrease the 
likelihood of receiving less than 70% approval in the current year. This is consistent with 
a greater amount of firms that are concerned with not reaching the 70% threshold 
utilizing pocketed pay in their pay for performance disclosures; for those combating prior 
poor Say on Pay results, it is effective on average. 
The findings in the paper contribute to the literature on CEO pay, Pay for 
Performance, Say on Pay, and peer comparisons. Ertimur, Muslu, and Ferri (2011) find 
that negative recommendations for Say on Pay lead to firms engaging with investors 
and making changes to their compensation plan. However, Illiev and Vitanova (2013) 
find that Say on Pay did not affect the level or composition of CEO pay but they do not 
consider its effect on disclosure behavior or other methods of response. Although Say 
on Pay may or may not directly affect the level or composition of CEO pay, it may cause 
firms to opportunistically disclose alternative pay measures justified by peer 
comparisons to convince shareholders pay appropriately reflects performance without 
making any material changes to compensation. However, on the other hand Say on Pay 
may also cause firms to informatively disclose alternative measures and peer 
comparisons as part of firms increasing their engagement with investors. This paper 
expands the possibilities in which firms may respond to Say on Pay and also contributes 
to the literature and debate on compensation regulation by drawing attention to the 
need for consistency in Pay for Performance disclosure. 
 
 
Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
 
The number of firms reporting alternative pay measures has increased substantially in 
recent years (Equilar, 2015). Given this increase, two hypotheses are developed: Early 
adopters of these measures may be informative in their additional disclosures or they 
may be opportunistic in these disclosures. In addition, the incentives and type of 
disclosure may be different among alternatives for pay measures as well.  
 
Compensation Disclosure and Opportunism 
Many have argued that compensation is the result of powerful managers setting their 
own pay (Frydman & Jenter 2010, Murphy 2013). In line with this view, Armstrong, 
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Ittner, and Larcker’s (2010) results are consistent with claims that compensation 
consultants provide a mechanism for CEOs of companies with weak governance to 
extract and justify excess pay. Similarly, Faulkender and Yang (2010) find that firms 
appear to select highly paid peers in their newly disclosed compensation peer groups to 
justify their CEO compensation. Cadman et al. (2012) also find that executive 
compensation restrictions associated with TARP influenced banks’ participation in the 
program in a manner consistent with pay preservation. In addition to self-serving 
behavior in pay decisions, there is also evidence of opportunistic disclosure behavior 
among managers. Lewellen et al. (1996) suggest that firm managers display self-
serving behavior in discretionary information disclosure decisions. Bamber et al. (2010) 
also find that individual manager influences play an economically significant role in their 
firms’ voluntary disclosure choices.  
This leads to the first hypothesis:  
H1: Alternative compensation measures are opportunistic disclosures 
about Pay for Performance. 
If firms are reporting alternative pay measures opportunistically, one would expect only 
firms with lower pocketed or market-value compensation, in comparison with peer firms, 
to use these measures. In addition, if opportunistic disclosers are trying to shroud poor 
Pay for Performance, these reporters are expected to be associated with lower levels of 
performance and higher levels of compensation compared with other similar firms.  
 
Compensation Disclosure and Informativeness 
Despite the apparent incentive to voluntarily disclose these alternatives in a self-serving 
manner, challenges inherent in executive compensation as disclosed in the Summary 
Compensation Table have been noted. This gives rise to the need for a more 
informative alternative method and disclosure. For example, Bettis et al. (2012) show 
that on average, firms overstate SCT grant date values by 50%. Mandated disclosures 
also often miss important components of the compensation decision methodology. De 
Angelis and Grinstein (2014) provide evidence of the heavy use of relative performance 
evaluation in firms’ pay-setting processes despite a lack of disclosure provided to give 
context into this black box. In addition to a need for more informative compensation 
disclosure, agency theory provides support for informative rather than opportunistic 
disclosure, suggesting that executive compensation and disclosure are set effectively to 
maximize the value of the firm (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Fama (1980) argues that 
directors are incentivized to act in the best interest of shareholders through the 
competitive labor market. In line with this view, many have viewed compensation as a 
result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. For example, 
Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) find that shareholders react increasingly 
negative to executive pay regulation at firms with highly paid CEOs, consistent with the 
idea that the market perceives that the regulation of executive compensation results in 
less desirable contracts and potentially decreases the supply of high-qualified 
executives. Similarly, Kaplan (2008) argues that compensation is largely determined by 
market forces and Say on Pay voting will impose costs without providing significant 
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benefits. Perhaps disclosure of alternative measures is a potential way to offset these 
costs. By producing additional informative disclosure, firms may be able to prevent the 
adoption of suboptimal pay practices at the requests of ill-informed shareholders as 
Kaplan feared.  
This leads to the second hypothesis:  
H2: Alternative compensation measures are informative disclosures about 
Pay for Performance. 
If firms are reporting alternative pay measures informatively, one would expect these 
firms to not be associated with negative compensation characteristics. Informative 
reporters are not expected to be associated with lower levels of performance combined 
with higher levels of compensation compared with other similar firms. In addition, 
informative disclosers may be associated with other positive changes to compensation if 
combating a lack of shareholder support for compensation. 
 
Compensation Disclosure and Say on Pay 
Results on the effectiveness of Say on Pay are mixed. Illiev and Vitanova (2013) find 
that Say on Pay did not affect the level or composition of CEO pay while Ertimur, Ferri, 
and Oesch (2012) find that proxy advisor recommendations are the key determinant of 
Say on Pay voting outcomes and these negative recommendations for Say on Pay lead 
to firms engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation plans. 
Neither of these studies consider alternative disclosures as a possible response or 
determinant of Say on Pay. Although Say on Pay may or may not directly affect the 
level or composition of CEO pay, it may cause firms to change their disclosure behavior, 
either opportunistically or informatively. It would likely be the goal of both opportunistic 
and informative disclosers to increase future Say on Pay voting results. If informative 
disclosers are effective and the market recognizes differences in informativeness and 
opportunism, one would expect to see better future Say on Pay results for these 
disclosers.  
 
 
Data & Methodology 
 
Three samples are formed on the basis of S&P 500 firms’ Pay for Performance 
discussions in their annual proxy statements for 2012 through 2014 proxy seasons 
reflecting fiscal years 2011 through 2013. The samples include 105 firm proxies that 
utilize “pocketed” compensation, 91 firm proxies that include “market-value” 
compensation, and 67 firm proxies that report “peer comparisons” of percentile rankings 
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of market-value compensation in their Pay for Performance discussions.26 These firms 
are compared with 1,237 control S&P 500 proxies that do not utilize alternative pay 
measures in Pay for Performance discussions. 
 Firms that report “pocketed” realized pay do so in a number of ways. Sometimes 
it is presented as a separate table and other times it is presented as an additional row in 
the Summary Compensation Table. The calculation generally always includes Salary, 
Bonus, and Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation from the Summary Compensation 
Table. However, the treatment of Change in Pension Value and Nonqualified Deferred 
Compensation Earnings as well as Other Compensation varies across firms with some 
excluding and others including these components. Sometimes the calculation is more 
difficult to link to SCT pay. One common example is the reporting of W-2 earned 
income. The most significant difference from SCT compensation comes in the treatment 
of stock and option awards. Where the SCT measures these on a grant date value 
basis, “pocketed” compensation includes only the value of stock vested and options 
exercised during the period. For this study’s purposes, “pocketed” compensation is 
calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, 
Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options Exercised during the period. SCT pay 
is the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in 
Pension Value and Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, 
Option Awards, and Other Compensation. Calculated “pocketed” compensation is 
utilized to overcome differences in how firms calculate their measures. 
 The appendix contains examples of three of the most common methods of 
reporting “pocketed” pay. In Figure 1, Allstate produces a separate “Supplemental Table 
of CEO Compensation Realized in 2011” under the heading of Pay for Performance. 
This table excludes Other Compensation but includes cash salary and bonus as well as 
shares vested and options exercised. In Figure 2, LCA Vision simply includes an 
additional column in the SCT titled “Total Realized Compensation.” The footnote 
explains that their calculation includes Other Compensation but values the bonus 
amount differently than the SCT. Finally, in Figure 3 GE produces a separate table that 
contains only W-2 values with no other information which is entitled “2011 Realized 
Compensation Table.” 
 The calculation of “market-value” realizable compensation is somewhat similar to 
that of “pocketed” realized compensation. The difference lies in the treatment of stock 
and option awards which are valued based on the end of the period rather than grant 
date based values or only values vested or exercised. While “market-value pay” aims to 
capture a current snapshot of the updated market value of total compensation, including 
outstanding equity compensation awarded in prior years, there are often differences in 
                                            
 
 
 
26 Realized compensation (“pocketed pay”) aims to capture cash the executives actually pocketed in a 
given year while realizable compensation (“market-value pay”) aims to capture a current snapshot of the 
updated market value of total compensation, including outstanding equity compensation awarded in prior 
years. 
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how it is calculated. Most commonly, it includes the sum of salary paid, stock award 
balances, and outstanding options valued at the end of the reporting period. Common 
differences include the time period reported (one year versus three years), the inclusion 
or exclusion of out of the money options, and the inclusion or exclusion of vested stock 
and exercised options. The market-value of outstanding equity compensation is 
included to capture the driving force of this alternative compensation measure. It is 
calculated as the sum of the current market value (as of the report date) of outstanding 
stock grants, options, and equity incentive plan shares. 
Firms that report “market-value” compensation also do so in different ways. 
However, there are two most common methods. First, many firms report graphical 
presentations that link coarse levels of realizable pay with shareholder returns as 
illustrated in Marriott’s “CEO Realizable Pay and Company Performance” graph in its 
2013 proxy statement included in Figure 4 in the appendix. Others provide detailed 
breakdowns of the components of “market-value” realizable pay as shown in Hospira’s 
“Actual and Realizable Compensation in 2012” table in Figure 5 and Alcoa’s “2012 CEO 
Realizable Pay Compared to Grant Date Value” table in their 2013 proxy statements 
included in Figure 6. 
Finally, those that report peer rankings of market-value pay also generally do so 
in one of two ways. As illustrated in Figure 7 by Stanley Black and Decker’s 2013 proxy 
statement, some firms simply state the percentile rankings of realizable pay and firm 
performance relative to peers. Others, more commonly, produce a graphical 
representation of the relation between realizable pay and stock performance with peer 
comparisons as shown in Sherwin Williams’ “Pay for Performance Alignment – CEO 
Realizable Pay and TSR” graph in its 2014 proxy statement in Figure 8 and 
RadioShack’s “Top-5 Pay-for-Performance Analysis – Realizable Pay to Composite 
Performance” graph in its 2012 proxy statement in Figure 9. With its comparison across 
peer firms, this measure may be more informative than other measures for 
comparability reasons. However, given the prior evidence of self-interest directed peer 
selection to justify high levels of pay, this measure could be used opportunistically as 
well. Regardless of the format used, the amount of realizable compensation is not 
disclosed for this group but the relation between pay and performance is evident.  
 In addition to firm proxy statements, firm characteristics are collected from 
Compustat, stock data from CRSP, institutional ownership data from Thompson 13F 
filings, compensation data from Execucomp, CEO characteristics from Risk Metrics and 
proxy statements, and voting data from Voting Analytics and 8-Ks. CEO ability is 
collected from the index maintained by Demerjian et al. (2012).27 Excess CEO 
                                            
 
 
 
27 To calculate this measure, Demerjian et al. first estimate total firm efficiency within industries using data 
envelopment analysis, where efficient firms are those that generate more revenues from a given set of 
inputs including Cost of Goods Sold, Selling and Administrative Expenses, Net PP&E, Net Operating 
Leases, Net Research and Development, Purchased Goodwill, and Other Intangible Assets. Then, this 
efficiency measure is regressed on key firm-specific characteristics expected to aid or hinder 
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compensation is calculated as the difference between expected and actual 
compensation using the methodology of Core et al. (2008).28 The analysis is restricted 
to the 2012 proxy season and beyond in order to consider the impact of prior Say on 
Pay voting results on a firm’s decision to disclose alternative measures. 
Table 17 reflects descriptive statistics and comparisons for the three groups of 
alternative pay disclosers. The largest sample is that of pocketed pay disclosers. This 
group makes up approximately 7% of S&P 500 observations over the three year period 
and represents the largest S&P 500 firms with average sales of nearly $33 billion. 
However, these firms are also associated with significantly lower Q (1.57 compared with 
2.00 for non-reporting S&P 500 firms), institutional ownership (75.2% compared with 
80.0%), CEO ownership (0.3% compared with 1.2%), and CEO tenure (6.3 years 
compared with 7.6 years). On the other hand, market-value pay disclosers and peer 
comparison disclosers are smaller firms than the average S&P 500 member with 
average market caps of $20 billion and $17 billion respectively. These firms are also 
associated with lower Q on average, compared with non-reporting S&P 500 firms. 
Those firms that report peer comparisons are also associated with a higher E-Index 
than peer firms and lower CEO ownership indicative of weaker corporate governance. 
Finally, all three groups of alternative pay disclosers have significantly higher book-to-
market ratios that control firms. Between groups, those firms that report pocketed pay 
are significantly larger with significantly less institutional ownership than other 
alternative pay reporters while those firms that report market-value pay are larger and 
are characterized by greater CEO ownership and tenure than firms that utilize peer 
comparisons. These descriptive statistics point to differences among the three groups 
as evidenced by variation observed in performance, institutional ownership, and size. 
 
 
Determinants of Disclosing Alternative Pay Measures 
 
To test the hypotheses, the study first considers the determinants of being in any of the 
three samples, which include disclosing “pocketed” pay, disclosing “market-value” pay, 
or disclosing “peer comparisons” of market-value pay. Firm characteristics, including 
performance, measured by ROA and annual stock returns, size, measured by the 
                                            
 
 
 
management’s effort including firm size, market share, positive free cash flow, and firm age, and complex 
multi-segment and international operations. The residual of this regression is used to enable total 
efficiency to be partitioned between the firm and the manager to estimate manager ability, or MA Score 
as termed by Demerjian et al. This score is published by the authors on an annual basis. However, it has 
a limited sample size due to its dependence on a variety of inputs. 
28 Expected CEO compensation is a fitted value using the resulting coefficients from a cross-sectional 
regression of CEO total compensation on CEO tenure, prior year sales, prior year book-to-market ratio, 
current and prior years’ stock returns, current and prior years’ ROA, an indicator for S&P 500 inclusion, 
and year and two digit SIC industry fixed effects for the ExecuComp universe over the sample period. 
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natural log of sales, and institutional as well as CEO ownership are controlled for. 
Compensation characteristics including the natural log of total SEC Summary 
Compensation Table (SCT) pay, the percentage change in total SCT pay from the prior 
year, the level and change in excess pay, compensation composition percentages, the 
natural log of calculated pocketed pay, and the natural log of calculated market value of 
outstanding equity compensation are also examined.29 Finally, the impact of ISS issuing 
a recommendation against the firm as well as Say on Pay approval in the prior year are 
considered.  
 
Univariate Results 
Univariate results are presented in Table 18. Firms that report alternative pay measures 
are associated with significantly lower performance as measured by ROA, in 
comparison with the control group. Firms that report “pocketed” pay have an average 
return on assets of 4% while firms that report “market-value” pay or “peer comparisons” 
have average returns on assets of 5%, compared with an average return on assets of 
7% for the control group. Firms that report “pocketed” pay or “market-value” pay are 
also associated with significantly lower annual stock returns on average, compared with 
non-reporting S&P 500 firms. Firms that report “pocketed” (“market-value”) measures 
have average annual returns of 12% (10%) compared with average returns of 21% for 
the control group. While those that report “pocketed” or “market-value” pay have 
significantly lower stock returns than the control group, those that report peer 
comparisons do not, suggesting that firms choose to include peer comparisons when 
their performance is not substantially different from peers. 
In addition, firms that report alternative pay measures are firms with significantly 
lower calculated pocketed pay as well as market-value of outstanding equity 
compensation. While firms that report “pocketed” pay have average combined pocketed 
and outstanding equity compensation of $39.7 million, those who report “market-value” 
pay have $48.7 million on average, and those who report “peer comparisons” have 
$44.1 million on average, the control sample has $72.2 million in combined pocketed 
and outstanding equity compensation on average. However, “pocketed” pay reporting 
firms have significantly greater abnormal realized pay (-$3.8 million), the difference 
between pocketed pay and SCT pay, than their “market-pay” (-$6.8 million) and “peer 
comparison” (-$6.0 million) counterparts. This may indicate that “pocketed” pay 
reporters are disclosing this measure opportunistically since firms that disclose this 
                                            
 
 
 
29 Pocketed compensation is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity Incentive Plan 
Compensation, and All Other Compensation from the Summary Compensation Table as well as the Value 
of Stock Awards Vested and the Value of Option Awards Exercised from the Option Exercised and Stock 
Vested Table. The market value of equity compensation is calculated as the sum of the current market 
value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity incentive plan shares. 
Calculated measures of market value of equity pay and pocketed compensation are used to overcome 
differences in how firms calculate their measures. 
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measure are those with the lowest pocketed pay and market-value outstanding equity 
pay (which leads to future pocketed pay) combined with the largest levels and growth of 
SCT pay. These are the firms that benefit most from this disclosure.  
On the other hand, “peer comparison” reporters are not associated with 
significantly lower stock returns, yet they have significantly lower average SCT pay, 
$11.1 million compared with $13.1 million for “pocketed” reporters and $12.7 million for 
“market-value” reporters, and significantly lower excess compensation than “pocketed” 
reporters and control firms. Similarly, although not statistically significant, “peer 
comparison” reporters are also characterized by lower increases in SCT pay than other 
alternative pay reporters and control firms. Finally, these firms are also characterized by 
significantly lower portions of cash compensation compared with “market-value” 
reporters and control firms as well as significantly lower portions of bonus compensation 
compared with other alternative pay reporters and control firms. Having lower levels and 
changes of SCT pay and excess compensation is not characteristic of opportunistic 
disclosure and may point towards informative incentives for the “peer comparison” 
sample.  
However, all three groups are associated with an increased proportion of 
receiving a recommendation against Say on Pay from ISS and receiving less approval 
in the prior Say on Pay vote. For example, those that report “pocketed” pay have 
average prior Say on Pay approval of 84.7%, those that report “market-value” pay have 
82.8% average prior approval, and those that report “peer comparisons” have average 
prior support of 85.3%, while control S&P 500 firms have average prior support of 
89.9%. Similarly, 15.2% of “pocketed” reporters received a recommendation against 
Say on Pay from ISS in the prior vote, 15.4% of “market-value” pay reporters did, and 
17.9 % of “peer comparison” reporters also did, while only 7.8% of control S&P 500 
firms received a recommendation against Say on Pay from ISS in their prior vote. This 
suggests that these firms are choosing to disclose alternative pay measures to combat 
prior poor Say on Pay voter support as well as external criticisms of pay practices. 
 
Multivariate Results 
Multinomial Logistic Regressions are utilized to evaluate the determinants of choosing 
to disclose alternative pay measures in annual proxy statements using the S&P 500 
non-disclosing control sample as the base outcome. Multinomial logistic regressions are 
similar to logistic models except it allows the dependent variable to be categorical. 
Using the S&P 500 control sample as the base outcome causes this to be used as the 
baseline comparison group. Coefficients are interpreted as the change in the relative log 
odds of being in the sample of interest versus not being in any of the samples. 
Accordingly, eq. (10) is utilized where the probability of disclosing alternative pay 
measures is regressed on firm sales, ROA, annual returns, institutional and CEO 
ownership, the level and change of SEC mandated Summary Compensation Table 
(SCT) pay, the level and change of excess compensation, calculated pocketed pay, the 
market value of outstanding equity compensation, the percentages of compensation 
comprised of cash, bonus, stock, and options, and the changes in stock grants, options 
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grants, and in the market value of outstanding equity pay. Finally, a prior Say on Pay 
Outcome is controlled for in each of the three specifications in Table 19. First, the 
impact of receiving a recommendation against Say on Pay from ISS in the prior vote is 
examined. Second, the level of Say on Pay support in the prior vote is considered and 
last, the impact of receiving less than 70% approval in the prior Say on Pay vote is 
controlled for. 
(10) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) + 𝛽4
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐶𝑇 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽7
∗ 𝑆𝐶𝑇 𝑃𝑎𝑦 % ∆ + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝑃𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑦 % ∆ + 𝛽10
∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑉 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽13
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽15 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽16
∗ ∆ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽17 ∗ ∆ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽18 ∗ ∆ 𝑀𝑉 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽19
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
This model estimates the determinants of a firm choosing to disclose “pocketed” 
pay, “market-value” pay, or “peer comparisons”, separately for each sample, comparing 
each to the base S&P 500 control group. If firms are disclosing opportunistically, one 
would expect that poor performance combined with greater levels of SCT compensation 
and lower levels of reported pay measures will increase the likelihood of reporting 
alternative compensation. However, if firms are reporting informatively, one would not 
expect these factors to drive these firms’ disclosure behavior. Results in Table 19 clarify 
much of what was observed in a univariate setting. First, results reveal that the 
likelihood of reporting “pocketed” pay is positively and significantly related to Summary 
Compensation Table pay levels and percentage changes of SCT pay and options 
granted. It is negatively and significantly related to levels of pocketed pay and the 
market value of outstanding equity pay (which leads to future pocketed pay). In addition, 
the likelihoods of reporting both “pocketed” pay and “peer comparisons” are negatively 
related to performance, as measured by ROA. “Pocketed” reporters are characterized 
by poor performance and higher SCT pay but lower pocketed pay indicating these firms 
are opportunistically disclosing this measure to mask poor performance combined with 
high compensation. On the other hand, while the likelihood of reporting “market-value” 
pay is positively and significantly related to Summary Compensation Table pay and 
negatively and significantly related to the market value of outstanding equity pay, it is 
also negatively related to excess compensation and unrelated to performance 
measures, inconsistent with opportunistic disclosure. Similarly, “peer comparison” 
reporting firms are not associated with lower stock returns, higher SCT pay, or lower 
alternative pay measures, also inconsistent with opportunistic disclosure.  
 Finally, the differential impacts of a past recommendation against Say on Pay 
from ISS and past Say on Pay support are examined. If firms are disclosing alternative 
pay measures in response to pressure from shareholders or advisory services, one 
would expect both ISS recommendations against Say on Pay and poor past Say on Pay 
support to increase the likelihood of reporting alternative compensation measures. The 
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amount of approval in the prior year’s vote is negatively related to reporting all 
measures while receiving a recommendation against Say on Pay from ISS in the prior 
year also increases the likelihood of reporting all alternative measures. However, 
reaching the 70% approval threshold is an important determinant for only those 
reporting “market-value” pay or “peer comparisons”. The higher the last year’s approval, 
the less likely a firm is to report alternative pay measures. In addition, receiving less 
than 70% approval in the prior year increases the likelihood that a firm will choose to 
disclose “market-value” pay or “peer comparisons”. These results are consistent with 
these firms receiving prior scrutiny of their pay practices and trying to combat that 
pressure with additional disclosure. 
 
 
The Impact on Say on Pay Associated With Disclosure of Alternative 
Pay Measures 
 
Since past Say on Pay results are important determinants for all alternative pay 
disclosers, the study also considers the impact of disclosing alternative pay measures 
on future Say on Pay support and ISS recommendations against Say on Pay. If firms 
are combating prior pressure regarding their pay practices, examining future Say on 
Pay support will indicate if these firms were effective in their disclosure. In addition, one 
would expect informative disclosers to impact Say on Pay results more significantly than 
opportunistic disclosers if shareholders and advisory services can successfully 
distinguish between the two types of disclosure. 
 
Univariate Results 
In addition to the apparent differences in incentives to disclose between groups, 
univariate results presented in Table 20 indicate that there are also significant 
differences in Say on Pay outcomes between groups of alternative pay disclosers. 
While “pocketed” pay and “market-value” pay disclosers continue to experience Say on 
Pay support significantly below peer firms, those that disclose “peer comparisons” no 
longer receive significantly different Say on Pay support from peer firms after 
significantly larger growth in support from the prior vote. This leads to significantly less 
firms who report “peer comparisons” receiving less than majority support in Say on Pay, 
compared with S&P non-disclosing firms. These results are consistent with “peer 
comparisons” having a greater impact on Say on Pay or being associated with other 
characteristics that positively affect Say on Pay approval, consistent with informative 
disclosure. 
 
Multivariate Results 
The impact of reporting alternative compensation measures on Say on Pay support and 
ISS recommendations is also examined in a multivariate setting. Multiple Say on Pay 
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outcomes are regressed on indicator variables for firms’ alternative pay disclosures and 
the interaction of disclosures with past Say on Pay outcomes while controlling for firm, 
compensation, and past Say on Pay characteristics using eq. (11). For each Say on Pay 
outcome, the impact of being in any of the three samples is first estimated jointly 
followed by estimates of the impacts of each sample separately. Interactions between 
the type of discloser and an indicator equal to one when the firm received less than 70% 
approval in the prior Say on Pay vote are included to capture whether the impact of 
disclosing alternative measures on current Say on Pay support is different for firms with 
prior poor Say on Pay support. Current recommendations against Say on Pay from ISS 
are also controlled for since research has shown this is a significant determinant of Say 
on Pay support (Thomas et al. 2011). 
(11) 
𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 < 70%𝑡−1 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 < 70%𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽7
∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 < 70%𝑡−1 + 𝛽8
∗ 𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11
∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐶𝑇 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽14
∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽15 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑦 % ∆ + 𝛽16 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽17
∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑉 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑦) + 𝛽18 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽19 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽20
∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 
  
In Table 21, eq. (11) is modeled in the first three columns using an ordinary least 
squares regression where the Say on Pay outcome is the level of support. Although 
there is no significant impact of reporting alternative pay measures on average, as 
shown in the first column, when interacted with prior poor Say on Pay support, the 
different impact is evident as seen in columns two and three. When examining the 
samples jointly, there is a significant and negative impact of reporting alternative pay 
measures on Say on Pay support on average. However, when looking at the samples 
individually, there is a significant, positive impact of disclosing both pocketed pay and 
peer comparison information on Say on Pay approval when combatting prior Say on 
Pay support, even while controlling for firm characteristics, compensation 
characteristics, prior Say on Pay support, and the impact of a recommendation against 
Say on Pay from ISS. This suggests that there is only a positive impact of reporting 
alternative pay measures on Say on Pay support when past support has been weak. In 
the fourth column, the change in Say on Pay support is considered and in the fifth 
column, the likelihood of an increase in Say on Pay support is examined. Both of these 
specifications reflect the negative impact associated with reporting “pocketed” pay on 
average. 
The Say on Pay outcome modeled in Table 22 is the likelihood of reaching the 
70% approval threshold using a logistic regression. Despite that disclosing “pocketed” 
pay or “peer comparison” information may increase the level of support for Say on Pay 
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in the current year; it is not enough to increase the likelihood of getting past the 70% 
approval threshold on average. In fact, reporting “pocketed” pay is actually associated 
with a decrease in the likelihood of reaching the 70% threshold. However, when 
interacted with prior poor Say on Pay support, as evidenced by receiving less than 70% 
approval in the prior year, reporting alternative pay measures increases the likelihood of 
receiving more than 70% approval in the current year. When the sample is broken down 
into pocketed pay disclosers, market value pay disclosers, and peer comparison 
disclosers, it is evident that pocketed pay disclosers are driving this result. This is 
consistent with a greater amount of firms that are concerned with not reaching the 70% 
threshold utilizing pocketed pay as an alternative pay measure; for those combating 
prior poor Say on Pay results, it is effective on average. 
Finally, the likelihood of receiving an ISS recommendation against Say on Pay is 
modeled using a logistic regression in Table 23. There is no evidence of a significant 
relation between reporting alternative pay measures and the likelihood of receiving a 
recommendation against Say on Pay from ISS. These results indicate that although 
providing some supplemental compensation information may have a positive effect on 
the level of Say on Pay approval, these measures do not seem to positively influence 
ISS and the recommendations it issues.  
  
 
Supplemental Analyses 
 
To address concerns of endogeneity and correlation in error terms given the link 
between prior Say on Pay results, reporting alternative pay measures, and future Say 
on Pay results, analysis is repeated evaluating the impact of disclosing alternative pay 
measures on Say on Pay outcomes using predicted likelihoods of reporting. First, 
predicted values for the likelihoods of reporting “pocketed” pay, “market-value” pay, and 
“peer comparisons” are predicted using eq. (10) and the second model from Table 19. 
Predicted likelihoods are then used to estimate interactions and the impact on Say on 
Pay support using eq. (11) and the third model from Table 21. As shown in Table 24, 
there is a significant and positive relation between the likelihood of reporting “pocketed” 
pay on the level of Say on Pay support but only when combatting prior poor Say on Pay 
support. This provides further evidence that the impact of additional disclosure is only 
significant when combatting prior poor Say on Pay support. 
This process is repeated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) methodology 
for the individual impacts of reporting “pocketed” pay, “market-value” pay, and “peer 
comparisons” on Say on Pay support.30 In the first stage for each method of alternative 
pay disclosure, the likelihood of reporting is predicted using the variables in eq. (10). In 
                                            
 
 
 
30 Interactions with prior poor Say on Pay are not utilized due to restrictions within the IV regression 
framework. 
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the second stage, the effect on Say on Pay support is estimated using the predicted 
likelihood of reporting alternative pay measures individually. Each specification in Table 
25 corresponds to a method of alternative pay disclosure in which the sample is 
restricted to the specific pay disclosers and non-disclosing control firms. Although there 
is no evidence of a statistically significant relation between reporting “pocketed” or 
“market-value” pay on Say on Pay support, a continued positive and statistically 
significant relation between reporting “peer comparisons” and Say on Pay support is 
observed, further illustrating the value of reporting comparative pay.  
Propensity score matching analysis is also utilized to address the confounding 
effects of covariates that may predict both firms’ voluntary disclosure of alternative 
compensation measures and their Say on Pay support. Table 26 tabulates the resulting 
coefficients from estimations of propensity scores for each discloser sample based on 
matching on industry, year, performance, compensation characteristics, and past Say 
on Pay support. Consistent with prior results, Table 26 reveals that ROA, calculated 
pocketed pay, market-value of outstanding equity compensation, and prior Say on Pay 
support are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of reporting “pocketed” 
pay while the level of SEC mandated SCT pay is positively and significantly related. The 
likelihood of reporting “market-value” pay is positively and significantly related to the 
level of SCT pay and negatively and significantly related to market-value of outstanding 
equity compensation, excess compensation, and prior Say on Pay support. Finally, the 
likelihood of reporting “peer comparisons” is negatively and significantly related to ROA, 
pocketed compensation, the proportion of cash compensation, and prior Say on Pay 
support.  
Using propensity scores developed from the regressions in Table 26, propensity 
score matched analysis is utilized to estimate the average treatment effect of reporting 
alternative pay measures on Say on Pay support while matching to control firms based 
on industry, performance, compensation characteristics, and past Say on Pay support. 
Results are presented in Table 27. When using kernel matching, in which all 
observations are used but each control observation is weighted based on its propensity 
score’s proximity to the treatment observation’s propensity score, a statistically 
significant, negative relation is observed between reporting “pocketed” pay or “market-
value” pay and Say on Pay support. This relation is also observed for the “pocketed” 
pay sample when utilizing stratification matching, in which treatment observations are 
only matched to controls with propensity scores within the same block, where control 
and treatment observations have the same mean propensity scores in each block. 
Despite evidence of the negative and significant impact of reporting “pocketed” or 
“market-value” pay on Say on Pay support when matching on performance, 
compensation, and past Say on Pay characteristics, there is no evidence of a significant 
negative relation between reporting “peer comparisons” and Say on Pay support. 
Further, when the sample is constrained to those with prior low Say on Pay approval, 
the negative relation does not hold suggesting that although there is evidence of a 
negative relation on average, reporting alternative pay measures can have a positive 
impact when combatting past poor Say on Pay support. 
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Finally, given that results reveal differences in the motivations and characteristics 
of firms who utilize these alternative methods and some evidence of both opportunistic 
and informative disclosure aimed at influencing the Say on Pay vote, one may expect 
these firms to react differently to Say on Pay mandates. In their 2009 study, Cai and 
Walkling find that the market reaction to the passing of the Say-on-Pay Bill in the House 
of Representatives was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal CEO 
compensation, low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and for those responsive to 
shareholder pressure. Similarly, Ferri and Maber (2013) find that Say on Pay regulation 
in the UK was met with positive abnormal returns at firms with weak penalties for poor 
performance. Based on these results, one would expect opportunistic discloser firms to 
have significant positive abnormal returns in response to the passing of Say on Pay 
since these firms likely benefit from the additional oversight. If firms are disclosing 
informatively, one would not expect significant positive abnormal returns since these 
firms likely do not benefit from the increased oversight since they choose to disclose 
informatively without mandate. Following Cai and Walkling, market model, value 
weighted CARs are estimated for each sample for the three day window around April 
20, 2007, the date the House of Representatives passed the Say on Pay bill. These 
results are shown in Table 28. Congruous with previous results, only the “pocketed” pay 
sample experienced positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns in the three 
day window around the passing of Say on Pay, consistent with opportunistic disclosure, 
which may indicate that these are the firms that the market believes benefits most from 
this legislation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Results suggest that firms that disclose alternative pay measures do so for different 
reasons. These measures attract different types of firms and are not created equal. 
Although all three sets of disclosers are associated with prior poor Say on Pay support, 
firms that report “pocketed” pay are also characterized by poor performance as well as 
growing and large SCT pay but lower pocketed pay, compared with non-disclosers. This 
indicates these firms are opportunistically disclosing this measure to shroud poor 
performance combined with high compensation when the optics of disclosure are 
beneficial. Although firms that report market-value pay are associated with lower market 
value of outstanding equity pay and higher SCT pay compared with non-disclosers, they 
are also associated with lower excess compensation inconsistent with opportunistic 
disclosure. Similarly “peer comparison” reporting firms are related to factors associated 
with informative reporting; they are characterized by significantly less excess 
compensation than peer S&P 500 firms and are not influenced by performance or the 
optics of compensation measures. 
In addition to the apparent differences in incentives to disclose between groups, 
there are also significant differences in Say on Pay outcomes between groups of 
alternative pay disclosers. While “pocketed” pay and “market-value” pay disclosers 
85 
 
continue to experience Say on Pay support significantly below peer firms, those that 
disclose “peer comparisons” no longer receive significantly different Say on Pay support 
after significantly larger growth in support from the prior vote. These results are 
consistent with “peer comparisons” having a greater impact on Say on Pay. Although 
there is some evidence of a significant, positive impact of disclosing both “pocketed” 
pay and “peer comparison” information on Say on Pay approval in a multivariate setting, 
it is not enough to increase the likelihood of getting past the 70% approval threshold on 
average. However, when interacted with prior poor Say on Pay support, as evidenced 
by receiving less than 70% approval in the prior year, reporting “pocketed” pay 
increases the likelihood of receiving more than 70% approval in the current year. This is 
consistent with a greater amount of firms that are concerned with not reaching the 70% 
threshold utilizing “pocketed” pay as an alternative compensation measure; for those 
combating prior poor Say on Pay results, it is effective on average. 
 This study provides a first look at the propagation of alternative pay measures. 
Further research into the measures themselves and their relation to performance will 
produce much needed insight for future legislation. Given the lack of comparability and 
transparency in these measures across firms, this is challenging at this time. Although 
there may be benefits to an alternative measure for pay, without mandated methods 
established, it appears that not all of these measures are being used to better inform 
shareholders. Perhaps this possibility of opportunistic disclosure is an unintended 
consequence of mandated Say on Pay votes. In addition, this highlights the importance 
of standardized Pay for Performance disclosure across firms. Differences in how pay is 
measured has significant implications for the comparability and usefulness of Pay for 
Performance disclosure.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Pay Reporters – S&P 500 Sample, 
2011-2013 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Market Cap (in 
millions), Assets (in millions), Sales (in millions), Tobin’s Q, and BTM are collected from 
Compustat and CRSP. Tenure, age, and CEO ownership are collected from 
ExecuComp. E-Index is collected from RiskMetrics. Institutional ownership is calculated 
using Thompson 13-f data. Differences between samples and control are identified by 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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 Pocketed Pay (N=105)  Potential Pay (N=91) 
 
Peer Comparison 
(N=67) 
 
S&P 500 Control 
(N=1237) 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
            
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Firm and CEO Characteristics        
Sales 32654.52* 6026.30  19930.89 11390.95  14859.42** 7745.00  19938.60 8252.34 
Total Assets 61998.52 15328.14  53862.85 25869.00  19885.33*** 16073.00  60102.17 14091.00 
Market Cap 38070.67 11354.48  20332.74*** 13538.80  17238.73*** 11176.66  28894.94 13880.70 
Tobin's Q 1.57*** 1.34  1.62*** 1.29  1.66*** 1.38  2.00 1.60 
BTM 0.73*** 0.73  0.75*** 0.79  0.69** 0.73  0.62 0.61 
E-Index 1.96 2.00  2.01 2.00  2.32** 3.00  1.92 2.00 
Instit Ownership 75.24%*** 76.40%  79.57% 80.37%  81.76% 81.92%  80.04% 81.93% 
CEO Ownership 0.26%*** 0.16%  0.89% 0.28%  0.32%*** 0.23%  1.22% 0.23% 
CEO Tenure 6.31** 5.78  7.43 5.29  5.28*** 4.50  7.56 6.00 
CEO Age 56.50 56.00  57.33 57.00  56.82 57.00  56.81 57.00 
            
Panel B: Industry Breakdown           
Cnsumr NonDurables 3.81%**   7.69%   2.99%**   7.92%  
Cnsumr Durables 0.00%***   1.10%*   0.00%***   2.02%  
Manufacturing 18.10%***   13.19%*   28.36%***   7.03%  
Oil, Gas, and Coal  8.57%   12.09%   16.42%**   5.98%  
Chemicals 0.00%***   3.30%   4.48%   3.80%  
Business Equipment 14.29%   10.99%   8.96%*   15.28%  
Telephone & TV 5.71%   1.10%*   4.48%   3.31%  
Utilities 9.52%   9.89%   4.48%   6.71%  
Wholesale & Retail 2.86%***   6.59%   1.49%***   10.99%  
Healthcare & Drugs 6.67%   5.49%   10.45%   7.76%  
Finance 12.38%*   13.19%   8.96%**   18.27%  
Other 16.19%*   14.29%   8.96%   8.97%  
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Table 18: Univariate Results for Determinants of Reporting Alternative Pay 
Measures 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm performance characteristics, including ROA and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics.  
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 Pocketed Pay (N=105)  Potential Pay (N=91) 
 
Peer Comparison 
(N=67) 
 
S&P 500 Control 
(N=1237) 
        
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Panel A: Univariate Results for Performance Characteristics        
ROA 3.93%*** 3.58%  5.07%*** 4.14%  4.73%*** 4.26%  6.96% 6.07% 
Annual Return 12.44%*** 9.81%  10.49%*** 7.26%  17.86% 15.10%  20.76% 18.00% 
     
Panel B: Univariate Results for CEO Compensation Characteristics     
SEC SCT Pay 13078.74 10965.79  12746.34 11486.87  11117.36 9512.32  12014.74 10136.25 
Pocketed Pay 16828.82*** 12442.01  19501.02** 14779.36  17101.06*** 14949.80  27801.03 15864.68 
SCT-Pocketed Diff  -3750.08*** -1696.30  -6754.68** -2618.67  -5983.71*** -3918.51  -15806.90 -4603.15 
% Δ in SCT Pay 443.86% 6.98%  14.55% 3.48%  12.79% 6.81%  47.05% 6.53% 
MV Outstd Equity 22861.12*** 13294.40  29245.50*** 18484.60  27017.44*** 20903.04  44404.15 22657.90 
% Δ MV Equity Pay 212.18% 11.37%  70.52% 4.75%  341.24% 26.19%  71.17% 15.58% 
Deferred Pay 269.81*** 72.60  764.99 108.23  961.86 257.63  681.15 82.73 
Excess Comp 2316.58 1134.54  1624.49 1293.30  774.54* 324.55  1789.3 465.50 
Δ in Excess Comp 1281.47 191.92  -83.37 69.72  -816.43 -429.34  411.53 -123.60 
% Δ Excess Comp -107.09% -70.47%  -83.25% -50.18%  7.96% -38.11%  12.20% -49.02% 
% Cash 14.79%* 12.86%  16.18% 13.11%  13.41%*** 11.85%  16.84% 12.58% 
% Equity 59.98% 64.66%  61.09% 64.52%  60.52% 61.74%  57.73% 61.86% 
% Pocketed 48.17% 29.63%  78.23% 40.64%  66.72% 45.86%  97244644% 60.82% 
% Salary 13.07% 12.02%  13.63% 11.69%  12.98% 11.84%  14.08% 11.58% 
% Bonus 1.71%* 0.00%  2.56% 0.00%  0.43%*** 0.00%  2.76% 0.00% 
% Stocks 47.33%*** 48.86%  39.43% 35.40%  36.35% 36.50%  38.81% 39.18% 
% Options 12.65%*** 6.13%  21.65% 22.54%  24.16%** 19.50%  18.92% 15.26% 
% Δ Stocks 35.25% 8.58%  103.86% 3.00%  33.01% 9.97%  70.58% 5.01% 
% Δ Options 108.29% -8.32%  -13.66%** -2.39%  3.65% 2.68%  4.41% 0.00% 
% Shares Vested 34.05% 24.44%  29.89% 19.68%  36.71% 25.44%  97244071% 31.63% 
% Options Exrcsd 14.12% 0.00%  48.34% 0.00%  30.01% 0.00%  572.97% 3.83% 
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Table 18. Continued. 
  
     
 
  
 
  
 Pocketed Pay (N=105)  Potential Pay (N=91) 
 
Peer Comparison 
(N=67) 
 
S&P 500 Control 
(N=1237) 
        
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
            
Panel C: Univariate Results for Say on Pay (SoP) Voting Characteristics     
Hold Say on Payt 99.05%*** 1.00  98.90%*** 1.00  98.51%** 1.00  94.58% 1.00 
Annual SoP Freq 95.24% 1.00  93.41% 1.00  95.52% 1.00  92.97% 1.00 
SoP Support (t-1) 84.74%*** 91.90%  82.79%*** 89.40%  85.34%** 93.00%  89.94% 94.30% 
ISS Against SoP(t-1) 15.24%** 0.00  15.38%* 0.00  17.91%** 0.00  7.76% 0.00 
SoP <70% (t-1) 19.05% 0.00  24.18%** 0.00  20.90% 0.00  13.74% 0.00 
SoP < Majority (t-1) 3.81%** 0.00  8.79% 0.00  5.97% 0.00  7.92% 0.00 
Differences between samples and control are identified by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19: Multivariate Results for Determinants of Reporting Alternative Pay 
Measures 
Analysis is performed using multinomial logistic regressions where each sample of 
disclosers is compared to the base S&P 500 control sample. The sample is comprised 
of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms that use “pocketed” pay in 
their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy reports. The second group is 
S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the third group reports “peer 
comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their Pay for Performance 
disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and Annual Returns, are 
collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in thousands) are 
collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated Summary 
Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of Salary, 
Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. Total Pay % coefficients have been multiplied by 103 and 
coefficients for Excess Pay have been multiplied by 105. 
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  Multinomial #1  Multinomial #2  Multinomial #3 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Pocketed 
Mkt 
Value Peers  Pocketed 
Mkt 
Value Peers  Pocketed 
Mkt 
Value Peers 
                        
Ln(Sales) -0.379** 0.027 -0.031  -0.345** 0.101 0.003  -0.365** 0.052 -0.025 
 (-2.298) (0.180) (-0.200)  (-2.090) (0.698) (0.021)  (-2.194) (0.363) (-0.170) 
ROA -8.513*** -2.920 -8.299***  -6.857*** -1.127 -6.650**  -8.441*** -2.473 -8.277*** 
 (-3.557) (-0.885) (-2.608)  (-2.875) (-0.318) (-2.151)  (-3.547) (-0.711) (-2.609) 
Ln(Annual Return) -0.454 -1.194* 0.146  -0.338 -1.162 0.247  -0.494 -1.152 0.086 
 (-0.718) (-1.656) (0.231)  (-0.517) (-1.419) (0.385)  (-0.787) (-1.572) (0.139) 
Instit Ownership -0.025** 0.010 0.004  -0.025** 0.006 0.006  -0.023** 0.011 0.006 
 (-2.520) (0.746) (0.383)  (-2.481) (0.419) (0.510)  (-2.341) (0.862) (0.586) 
CEO Ownership -0.641** 0.051 -0.447**  -0.769** 0.054 -0.432*  -0.650*** 0.057 -0.438** 
 (-2.552) (1.112) (-2.344)  (-2.430) (1.054) (-1.802)  (-2.601) (1.234) (-2.331) 
Ln(Total Pay) 2.839*** 2.488*** 0.384  2.601*** 2.235*** 0.264  2.850*** 2.471*** 0.423 
 (4.907) (4.906) (0.676)  (4.446) (4.595) (0.488)  (4.917) (4.999) (0.744) 
Total Pay % Δ* 0.005 -1.471 -1.652  0.005* -0.212 -1.281  0.005 -1.513 -1.803 
 (1.558) (-0.756) (-1.255)  (1.666) (-0.223) (-1.200)  (1.503) (-0.925) (-1.232) 
Excess Pay** -0.767 -6.902** 0.705  -0.724 -8.631*** 0.584  -1.312 -7.341** 0.270 
 (-0.327) (-2.002) (0.218)  (-0.288) (-2.598) (0.216)  (-0.554) (-2.263) (0.090) 
Excess Pay % Δ -0.015 -0.006 -0.006*  -0.015 -0.005 -0.006  -0.014 -0.006 -0.006* 
 (-0.685) (-0.726) (-1.678)  (-0.713) (-0.638) (-1.568)  (-0.688) (-0.690) (-1.666) 
Ln(Pocketed Pay) -1.415*** -0.188 -0.404  -1.335*** -0.035 -0.390  -1.408*** -0.133 -0.375 
 (-3.186) (-0.604) (-1.105)  (-2.961) (-0.118) (-1.071)  (-3.162) (-0.406) (-1.010) 
Ln(MV Equity Pay) -0.517*** -0.545*** -0.207  -0.531*** -0.547*** -0.236  -0.523*** -0.557*** -0.235 
 (-3.020) (-3.570) (-0.938)  (-3.048) (-3.553) (-1.168)  (-3.091) (-3.681) (-1.086) 
% Bonus -6.750*** -6.753*** -12.312**  -6.623** -7.414*** -11.662*  -6.525** -7.143*** -11.693* 
 (-2.633) (-3.146) (-1.961)  (-2.479) (-3.686) (-1.912)  (-2.495) (-3.287) (-1.944) 
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Table 19. Continued. 
            
  Multinomial #1  Multinomial #2  Multinomial #3 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Pocketed 
Mkt 
Value Peers  Pocketed 
Mkt 
Value Peers  Pocketed 
Mkt 
Value Peers 
% Stocks 1.022 1.215 -0.227  1.191 0.834 -0.029  1.043 1.253 -0.124 
 (1.274) (1.475) (-0.284)  (1.426) (1.052) (-0.037)  (1.314) (1.553) (-0.160) 
% Options -1.124 2.420** 1.129  -0.950 2.487*** 1.585*  -1.127 2.413** 1.134 
 (-1.081) (2.548) (1.212)  (-0.902) (2.696) (1.737)  (-1.117) (2.552) (1.258) 
% Δ Stock Grants -0.027 0.012* 0.005  -0.015 0.035** 0.014  -0.028 0.009 0.002 
 (-0.789) (1.885) (0.740)  (-0.557) (2.165) (0.945)  (-0.834) (1.494) (0.303) 
% Δ Option Grants 0.047*** -0.426 -0.021  0.055*** -0.425 -0.000  0.049*** -0.381 -0.004 
 (2.890) (-1.345) (-0.238)  (3.217) (-1.213) (-0.001)  (3.024) (-1.174) (-0.113) 
% Δ MV Equity Pay 0.011 0.013 0.017  0.010 0.013 0.018*  0.011 0.014 0.019 
 (0.975) (1.092) (1.552)  (1.017) (1.094) (1.657)  (1.015) (1.081) (1.564) 
Cash Ratio 3.913** 6.401*** 1.069  3.921* 6.400*** 0.944  3.801* 6.660*** 0.871 
 (2.008) (4.167) (0.429)  (1.958) (4.242) (0.387)  (1.921) (4.038) (0.348) 
ISS Against SoP t-1 0.750** 0.720** 1.217***         
 (1.964) (2.147) (3.393)         
Say on Pay % t-1     -2.910*** -4.198*** -3.247***     
     (-2.868) (-4.615) (-2.966)     
Say on Pay<70% t-1         0.553 0.981*** 0.811** 
         (1.636) (3.369) (2.256) 
Year & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo R-squared 0.1984 0.1984 0.1984  0.2122 0.2122 0.2122  0.1974 0.1974 0.1974 
Observations 1,279 1,279 1,279   1,279 1,279 1,279   1,279 1,279 1,279 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 20: Univariate Results for Effects of Reporting Alternative Pay Measures on 
Say on Pay Outcomes 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics.  
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 Pocketed Pay (N=105)  Potential Pay (N=91) 
 
Peer Comparison 
(N=67) 
 
S&P 500 Control 
(N=1237) 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
            
Say on Pay Support t 85.59%*** 92.10%  85.02%*** 90.60%  90.15% 93.85%  90.71% 94.90% 
Change in Support t 0.94% -0.10%  2.19% 0.35%  4.80%** 0.70%  0.76% 0.20% 
ISS Against Say on Pay t 7.62% 0.00  10.99% 0.00  8.96% 0.00  5.98% 0.00 
Support <70% t 16.19% 0.00  15.38% 0.00  13.43% 0.00  11.72% 0.00 
Less than Majority Support t 3.81% 0.00  3.30%* 0.00  1.49%*** 0.00  7.11% 0.00 
Differences between samples and control are identified by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: Multivariate Results for Effects of Reporting Alternative Pay Measures 
on Say on Pay Support 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. In the first three specifications, the dependent variable is the 
level of Say on Pay support. In the fourth specification, the dependent variable is the 
change in the level of Say on Pay support and in the last specification, the dependent 
variable is an indicator variable equal to one when Say on Pay support increased from 
the prior year. Change in Excess Pay Coefficients have been multiplied by 10. 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Say on Pay Support Level Level Level 
 
Change 
 
Pr(Increase) 
      
All Disclosure Samples  -0.020**    
  (-1.965)    
All * Say on Pay <70% t-1  0.060    
  (1.566)    
Say on Pay <70% t-1 -0.008 -0.030 -0.032 -0.048 -2.898*** 
 (-0.288) (-0.933) (-1.008) (-0.766) (-4.994) 
Pocketed Pay Disclosure -0.023  -0.046*** -0.063*** -0.635* 
 (-1.448)  (-2.820) (-2.976) (-1.805) 
Pocketed * Say on Pay <70% t-1   0.134*** 0.143 2.243 
   (3.065) (1.645) (1.610) 
Market Value Pay Disclosure -0.017  -0.001 -0.008 -0.047 
 (-1.000)  (-0.047) (-0.421) (-0.124) 
Market Value * Say on Pay <70% t-1   -0.050 -0.140 -0.487 
   (-0.850) (-1.135) (-0.572) 
Peer Rankings Disclosure 0.025  0.005 -0.005 -0.232 
 (1.474)  (0.329) (-0.266) (-0.565) 
Peer * Say on Pay <70% t-1   0.094* 0.156 0.865 
   (1.799) (1.309) (0.879) 
Say on Pay % t-1 0.283*** 0.280*** 0.275*** -1.398*** -13.941*** 
 (4.400) (4.294) (4.257) (-5.407) (-8.495) 
ISS Against Say on Pay t-1 -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.243*** -1.787*** 
 (-8.544) (-8.616) (-8.807) (-8.172) (-4.691) 
Ln(Sales) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.110 
 (1.495) (1.484) (1.497) (0.917) (1.149) 
ROA 0.150** 0.146* 0.141* 0.139 4.923*** 
 (1.981) (1.882) (1.844) (1.338) (2.583) 
Ln(Annual Return) 0.022 0.025 0.022 -0.008 0.875** 
 (1.382) (1.600) (1.414) (-0.258) (2.166) 
CEO Owned -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 
 (-0.777) (-0.707) (-0.677) (-0.699) (-0.525) 
Ln(SCT Total Pay)  -0.041** -0.041** -0.040** -0.064** -0.875** 
 (-2.118) (-2.122) (-2.101) (-1.994) (-2.186) 
Ln(Excess Pay) -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.020 0.367 
 (-0.457) (-0.409) (-0.327) (-0.890) (1.167) 
Change in Excess Pay -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.044 
 (-1.763) (-1.896) (-1.626) (-0.742) (-1.403) 
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Table 21. Continued. 
 
 
  
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Say on Pay Support Level Level Level 
 
Change 
 
Pr(Increase) 
      
Ln(Pocketed Pay) -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.112 
 (-0.799) (-0.742) (-0.883) (-0.522) (-0.333) 
Ln(MV Outstanding Equity Pay) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.068 
 (0.485) (0.398) (0.478) (0.505) (0.580) 
Cash Compensation % -0.063 -0.063 -0.063 -0.149 1.161 
 (-1.085) (-1.116) (-1.097) (-1.489) (1.079) 
Equity Compensation % 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.041 0.142 
 (0.542) (0.481) (0.585) (0.978) (0.267) 
Vested/Exercised %  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.088 
 (-1.046) (-1.042) (-0.982) (-0.782) (-0.889) 
Constant 1.021*** 1.029*** 1.032*** 1.868*** 19.73*** 
 (7.547) (7.411) (7.567) (5.353) (6.916) 
      
Year & Industry Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 
R-squared 0.429 0.429 0.447 0.519 0.182 
 Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 22: Multivariate Results for Effects of Reporting Alternative Pay Measures 
on the Likelihood of Reaching the 70% Say on Pay Approval Threshold 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one 
when Say on Pay support is greater than 70%. 
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  (1) (2) 
Say on Pay Support > 70%   
   
All Disclosure Samples -0.435  
 (-1.277)  
All * Say on Pay <70% t-1 1.364**  
 (2.302)  
Pocketed Pay Disclosure  -0.821* 
  (-1.843) 
Pocketed * Say on Pay <70% t-1  3.280*** 
  (2.942) 
Market Value Pay Disclosure  0.114 
  (0.187) 
Market Value * Say on Pay <70% t-1  -0.098 
  (-0.117) 
Peer Rankings Disclosure  -0.102 
  (-0.170) 
Peer * Say on Pay <70% t-1  1.166 
  (0.989) 
Say on Pay <70% t-1 -2.336*** -2.363*** 
 (-7.751) (-7.735) 
ISS Against Say on Pay t-1 -2.168*** -2.245*** 
 (-6.914) (-7.135) 
Ln(Sales) 0.398** 0.395** 
 (2.428) (2.428) 
ROA -0.090 -0.530 
 (-0.041) (-0.237) 
Ln(Annual Return) 0.785 0.792 
 (1.287) (1.282) 
CEO owned 0.037 0.036 
 (0.834) (0.790) 
Ln(SCT Total Pay)  -1.328** -1.294** 
 (-2.123) (-2.068) 
Ln(Excess Pay) -0.162 -0.196 
 (-0.463) (-0.564) 
Change in Excess Pay 0.001 0.001 
 (0.297) (0.340) 
Ln(Pocketed) -0.020 -0.074 
 (-0.057) (-0.213) 
Ln(MV Outstanding Equity Pay) 0.118 0.142 
 (0.806) (0.958) 
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Table 22. Continued. 
   
  (1) (2) 
Say on Pay Support > 70%   
   
Cash Compensation % -1.627 -1.637 
 (-1.376) (-1.377) 
Equity Compensation % 0.744 0.836 
 (0.877) (0.981) 
Vested/Exercised % -0.023 -0.022 
 (-1.198) (-1.125) 
Constant 10.31*** 10.33*** 
 (3.290) (3.258) 
   
Year & Industry FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 1,405 1,405 
Psuedo R2 0.2895 0.2989 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: Multivariate Results for Effects of Reporting Alternative Pay Measures 
on the Likelihood of Receiving an ISS Recommendation Against Say on Pay 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one 
when ISS issues a recommendation against Say on Pay. 
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  (1) (2) 
ISS Recommendation Against Say on Pay  
      
All Disclosure Samples 0.001  
 (0.003)  
All * ISS Against Say on Pay t-1 0.871  
 (1.303)  
Pocketed Pay Disclosure  -0.121 
  (-0.171) 
Pocketed * ISS Against Say on Pay t-1  1.007 
  (0.902) 
Market Value Pay Disclosure  0.103 
  (0.162) 
Market Value * ISS Against Say on Pay t-1  0.720 
  (0.770) 
Peer Rankings Disclosure  0.059 
  (0.078) 
Peer * ISS Against Say on Pay t-1  0.844 
  (0.835) 
ISS Against Say on Pay t-1 0.435 0.436 
 (1.043) (1.048) 
Ln(Sales) -0.505*** -0.505*** 
 (-3.241) (-3.180) 
ROA -3.154 -3.213 
 (-1.155) (-1.187) 
Ln(Annual Return) -1.214** -1.205** 
 (-2.142) (-2.138) 
CEO owned 0.044 0.043 
 (1.108) (1.115) 
Ln(SCT Total Pay)  1.150* 1.162* 
 (1.750) (1.747) 
Ln(Excess Pay) -0.021 -0.016 
 (-0.047) (-0.038) 
Change in Excess Pay -0.006 -0.006 
 (-1.023) (-1.007) 
Ln(Pocketed) 0.286 0.271 
 (0.569) (0.558) 
Ln(MV Outstanding Equity Pay) -0.209 -0.209 
 (-1.250) (-1.254) 
Cash Compensation % 1.148 1.148 
 (0.895) (0.894) 
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Table 23. Continued. 
   
  (1) (2) 
ISS Recommendation Against Say on Pay  
   
Equity Compensation % 1.092 1.082 
 (1.322) (1.316) 
Vested/Exercised % -0.025 -0.020 
 (-0.124) (-0.105) 
Constant -10.02** -9.974** 
 (-2.548) (-2.540) 
   
Year & Industry FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 1,327 1,327 
Psuedo R2 0.1417 0.1417 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 24: Multivariate Results for Effects of Reporting Alternative Pay Measures 
on Say on Pay Support Using Predicted Likelihoods of Reporting Alternative Pay 
Measures 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. The dependent variable is the level of Say on Pay support. 
The likelihood of reporting each alternative pay measure has been predicted using eq. 
(10) and the second specification (columns 3 through 6) in Table 19. Predicted 
likelihoods are used for variables and interactions of interest. Change in Excess Pay 
Coefficients have been multiplied by 10. 
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    (1) 
Say on Pay Support Level   
      
Pocketed Pay Disclosure  -0.036 
  (-0.757) 
Pocketed * Say on Pay < 70% t-1  0.188* 
  (1.721) 
Market-Value Pay Disclosure  -0.055 
  (-0.690) 
Market-Value * SayonPay<70%t-1  0.063 
  (0.437) 
Peer Potential Pay Disclosure  0.064 
  (0.956) 
Peer * Say on Pay < 70% t-1  0.168 
  (0.962) 
Say on Pay < 70% t-1  -0.024 
  (-0.683) 
Say on Pay % t-1  0.336*** 
  (5.122) 
ISS Against Say on Pay t-1  -0.182*** 
  (-9.849) 
Ln(Sales)  0.012*** 
  (2.860) 
ROA  0.141** 
  (2.103) 
Ln(Annual Return)  0.025* 
  (1.729) 
CEO ownership  -0.002 
  (-0.961) 
Ln(SCT Total Pay)   -0.043** 
  (-2.263) 
Ln(Excess Pay)  -0.011 
  (-0.897) 
Change in Excess Pay  -0.001* 
  (-1.883) 
Ln(Pocketed Pay)  -0.002 
  (-0.233) 
Ln(MV Outstanding Equity Pay)  0.006 
  (1.225) 
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Table 24. Continued.  
   
    (1) 
Say on Pay Support Level   
   
Cash Compensation %  -0.015 
  (-0.309) 
Equity Compensation %  0.009 
  (0.441) 
Vested/Exercised %  -0.001* 
  (-1.651) 
Constant  0.856*** 
  (6.781) 
   
Year & Industry FEs  Yes 
Observations  1,207 
R-squared   0.419 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25: Multivariate Results for Effects of Reporting Alternative Pay Measures 
on Say on Pay Support Using Two Stage Least Squares 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. The dependent variable is the level of Say on Pay support. In 
the first stage, the likelihood of reporting each alternative pay measure has been 
estimated based on eq. (10) and these estimated likelihoods are used in the second 
stage for each alternative pay methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Say on Pay Support 
      
"Pocketed" 0.040   
 (0.706)   
"Market-Value"  0.305  
  (1.676)  
"Peer Comparisons"   0.256** 
   (2.217) 
Say on Pay (t-1) 0.293*** 0.374*** 0.312*** 
 (11.802) (8.531) (10.822) 
ISS Against Say on Pay -0.185*** -0.195*** -0.190*** 
 (-16.431) (-13.322) (-14.832) 
Ln(Sales) 0.012*** 0.009** 0.012*** 
 (3.931) (2.111) (3.294) 
ROA 0.164*** 0.133* 0.205*** 
 (2.788) (1.918) (3.071) 
Ln(Annual Return) 0.026* 0.050*** 0.018 
 (1.921) (2.599) (1.183) 
Ln(SCT Total Pay)  -0.052*** -0.062*** -0.046*** 
 (-4.523) (-4.279) (-3.683) 
Ln(Excess Pay) -0.011 0.004 -0.014 
 (-1.012) (0.289) (-1.202) 
Change in Excess Pay 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.892) (0.851) (1.126) 
Ln(Pocketed Pay) 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.097) (-0.355) (0.312) 
Ln(MV Outstanding Equity Pay) 0.007* 0.011** 0.007* 
 (1.829) (2.344) (1.771) 
Equity Compensation % 0.010 0.007 0.006 
 (0.562) (0.307) (0.288) 
Vested/Exercised % -0.002** -0.002 -0.002* 
 (-1.976) (-1.481) (-1.868) 
Constant 0.921*** 0.952*** 0.830*** 
 11.394) (9.945) (8.400) 
    
Observations 1,219 1,219 1,219 
R-squared 0.392 0.031 0.231 
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 26: Estimation of Propensity Scores Related to the Likelihood of Disclosing 
Alternative Pay Measures 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. The dependent variable is the likelihood of reporting each 
alternative pay measure. Excess Pay Coefficients multiplied by 105. 
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ESTIMATION OF THE PROPENSITY SCORE       
Treatment:  
 
"Pocketed" "Market-Value" 
"Peer 
Comparison" 
      
ROA -3.57*** -0.36 -2.59** 
 (1.19) (1.12) (1.26) 
Ln(Annual Return) 0.07 -0.28 0.21 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) 
Ln(SCT Total Pay) 0.95*** 0.67*** 0.26 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Percentage change in SCT Pay 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Excess Pay -0.71 -3.16** -1.79 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Change in Excess Pay -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln(Pocketed Pay) -0.69*** 0.04 -0.28* 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) 
Ln(MV Outstanding Equity Pay) -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.10 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Cash Ratio -0.84 0.20 -2.24** 
 (0.56) (0.51) (0.99) 
Change in Option Grants -0.03 -0.11 0.14 
 (0.02) (0.13) (0.11) 
Change in Stock Grants -0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Say on Pay (t-1) -1.23*** -1.84*** -1.33** 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.51) 
    
Matched by Year & Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,107 1,086 1,071 
Psuedo R-squared 0.139 0.101 0.065 
Standard errors reported in 
parentheses 
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Table 27: Estimation of Average Treatment Effects of Disclosing Alternative Pay 
Measures on Say on Pay Support Using Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Firm characteristics, including Sales, ROA, and 
Annual Returns, are collected from Compustat and CRSP. Compensation measures (in 
thousands) are collected from ExecuComp. SEC SCT Pay refers to SEC-Mandated 
Summary Compensation Table pay as reported by ExecuComp. SCT pay is the sum of 
Salary, Bonus, Non-equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Change in Pension Value and 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings, Stock Awards, Option Awards, and 
Other Compensation. Pocketed pay is calculated as the sum of Salary, Bonus, Non-
equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Other Compensation, Stock Vested, and Options 
Exercised during the period. MV Equity Pay is calculated as the sum of the current 
market value (as of the report date) of outstanding stock grants, options, and equity 
incentive plan shares. Deferred compensation is the sum of executive and firm deferred 
compensation plan contributions. Expected and excess compensation are computed 
using the methodology of Core et al. (2008). Say on Pay voting results are collected 
from ISS Voting Analytics. Treatment observations are matched to controls using 
propensity scores developed in Table 24. The dependent variable is Say on Pay 
support. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
         
 Whole Sample  Low Prior SoP 
Dependent Variable: Say on Pay Support 
Kernel 
Matching  
Stratification 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching  
         
Pocketed Pay Reporters  -0.04**  -0.03* 0.15 0.09 
  (-2.09)  (-1.81) (1.28) (1.57) 
Market Value Pay Reporters  -0.06***  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
  (-3.19)  (-0.85) (-0.06) (0.00) 
Peer Comparison Reporters  -0.00  -0.01 -0.05 0.03 
    (-0.17)   (-0.33) (-0.50) (0.35) 
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Table 28: Univariate Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns 
The sample is comprised of three groups of interest. The first group is S&P 500 firms 
that use “pocketed” pay in their Pay for Performance disclosures in their annual proxy 
reports. The second group is S&P 500 firms that report “market-value” pay while the 
third group reports “peer comparison” percentile rankings of market-value pay in their 
Pay for Performance disclosures. Mean Market Model Adjusted CARs based on the 
Value-Weighted Index are reported for the three day window around April 20, 2007, the 
date on which Say on Pay was mandated by law. 
 
 
 
 
        
      
      
Event Window     Mean CAR 
        
Panel A: CARs for “Pocketed” Sample      
(-30,-2)      -1.12% 
(-1,+1)      0.60%** 
(+2,+30)      -1.44%** 
        
Panel B: CARs for “Market-Value” Sample     
(-30,-2)      1.13% 
(-1,+1)      0.00% 
(+2,+30)      -0.85%* 
        
Panel C: CARs for “Peer Comparison” 
Sample      
(-30,-2)      0.73% 
(-1,+1)      0.06% 
(+2,+30)      0.76% 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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Figure 1. “Pocketed” – Allstate 2012 Proxy Statement 
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(3) The amounts reported in the Total Realized Compensation column differ substantially from the amounts 
reported in the Total column required under SEC rules and are not a substitute for the total amounts. The Total 
Realized Compensation represents: (1) Total compensation under applicable SEC rules, minus (2) the aggregate 
grant date fair value of RSUs awarded in the calendar year, plus (3) the value realized in the calendar year from 
the vesting shares of prior year RSU awards. Also, the Total Realized Compensation reflects any bonus actually 
paid in the calendar year, whereas Total compensation under SEC rules reflects any bonus earned in respect of 
the prior the calendar year. 
 
 
Figure 2. “Pocketed” – LCA 2012 Proxy Statement 
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2011 Realized Compensation Table 
  
Name and Principal Position      Realized Compensation   
Jeffrey R. Immelt 
Chairman of the Board and CEO    
  $7,822,378    
Keith S. Sherin 
Vice Chairman and CFO    
  $6,760,856    
John Krenicki 
Vice Chairman    
  $6,795,069    
Michael A. Neal 
Vice Chairman    
  $6,893,639    
John G. Rice 
Vice Chairman    
  $6,884,336    
 
 
Figure 3. “Pocketed” – GE 2012 Proxy Statement 
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Figure 4. “Market-Value” – Marriott 2013 Proxy Statement 
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Figure 5. “Market-Value” – Hospira 2013 Proxy Statement 
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Figure 6. “Market-Value” – Alcoa 2013 Proxy Statement 
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 Pay and Performance: An analysis of Chief Executive Officer realizable pay, as a percentage of targeted pay 
opportunity, is strongly aligned with the change in our TSR over the most recent 1- and 3-year periods. Further, 
analysis of actual compensation of our executives indicates that they were paid, in the aggregate, at the 
66th percentile relative to peers in 2011 (the latest year available for consistent comparisons). This compares with 
our pro-forma composite performance over the most recent 1-, 2- and 3-year periods that varied by performance 
metric between the 59th percentile and the 72nd percentile. 
 
Figure 7. “Peer Comparisons” – Stanley Black and Decker 2013 Proxy Statement 
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Figure 8. “Peer Comparisons” – Sherwin Williams 2013 Proxy Statement 
 
125 
 
 
 
Figure 9. “Peer Comparisons” – RadioShack 2012 Proxy Statement 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Given the literatures’ identification of the influence and breadth of external 
compensation monitoring in multiple forms, this dissertation further examines the impact 
of political forces and Say on Pay voting on executive compensation outcomes. First, 
the effect of political scrutiny on CEO compensation is analyzed using a sample of 
Federal contractors, which represents a group of firms where politicians yield the most 
power. Results suggest that Federal contractors with the most visible government 
contracts that make up significant portions of their revenue have lower CEO 
compensation, but the efficiency of this compensation structure is debatable as it leaves 
CEOs with weaker incentives. However, these results are muted when the firm has 
more bargaining power with the government. 
Second, the effects of the external forces of mandated compensation disclosure 
and shareholding voting requirements on compensation behavior are examined. Results 
suggest that firms that disclose alternative pay measures in their Pay for Performance 
discussions do so for different reasons. Although certain measures are characteristic of 
opportunistic disclosure and others are indicative of informative disclosure, their effects 
on Say on Pay are similar yet distinct. There is often a significant positive impact of 
disclosing additional information related to compensation on Say on Pay approval, 
particularly when combating prior poor Say on Pay support. However, the impact seems 
to be most significant when peer comparisons are shared, providing evidence of the 
value of reporting comparative pay. 
 These results shed light on additional external compensation monitoring in the 
form of political sensitivity and Say on Pay voting. Additional perspectives on the 
determinants of executive compensation are provided while revealing additional 
mechanisms of compensation stakeholder monitoring. The results also provide 
evidence that the possibility of opportunistic disclosure is an unintended consequence 
of mandated Say on Pay votes pointing to the importance of standardized Pay for 
Performance disclosure across firms.  
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